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1	
BOOK	REVIEW	THE	IMPORTANCE	OF	“MONEY”	THE	 MONEY	 PROBLEM:	 RETHINKING	 FINANCIAL	 REGULATION.	 	 By	 Morgan	Ricks.	 	 Chicago,	 Ill.:	 University	 of	 Chicago	 Press.	 	 2016.	 	 Pp.	 ix,	 336.		$45.00.	
Reviewed	by	Kathryn	Judge∗	In	 a	 provocative	 new	 book,	The	Money	 Problem:	 Rethinking	 Finan-
cial	 Regulation,	 Professor	 Morgan	 Ricks	 argues	 that	 the	 government	should	 reclaim	 control	 over	money	 creation.	 	Money,	 Ricks	 argues,	 is	not	 just	 the	 cash	 in	 your	 pocket	 or	 the	 balance	 in	 your	 checking	 ac-count.	 	 Instead,	at	 least	 for	purposes	of	 financial	 stability	policy,	mon-ey	 is	 best	 equated	 with	 short-term	 debt.	 	 For	 most	 of	 the	 twentieth	century,	 such	 debt	 was	 issued	 primarily	 by	 regulated	 commercial	banks	 and	 insured	 by	 the	 Federal	 Deposit	 Insurance	 Corporation	(FDIC),	 resulting	 in	 a	 fairly	 stable	 financial	 system.	 	 As	 a	 result	 of	 fi-nancial	innovation,	however,	much	of	today’s	short-term	debt	is	issued	in	 the	 far-less-regulated	 shadow	 banking	 system	 —	 a	 market-based	system	of	intermediation	that	serves	many	of	the	same	functions	tradi-tionally	performed	by	banks.	 	Runs	by	money	claimants	in	the	shadow	banking	system	were	central	to	the	2007–2009	financial	crisis	(Crisis).		The	 Dodd-Frank	 Wall	 Street	 Reform	 and	 Consumer	 Protection	 Act1	and	 other	 post-Crisis	 reforms,	 however,	 have	 done	 relatively	 little	 to	shut	down	 this	unauthorized	money	 creation.	 	That,	 in	Ricks’s	 assess-ment,	is	a	mistake.	The	 book	 provides	 a	 seemingly	 simple	 blueprint	 for	 reform:	 the	government	 should	 allow	 only	 banks	 to	 issue	 demandable	 debt,	 it	should	heavily	regulate	and	insure	all	such	debt,	and	it	should	prohibit	anyone	else,	other	 than	the	government,	 from	issuing	debt	with	a	ma-turity	 of	 less	 than	 a	 year,	 thereby	 preventing	 private	money	 creation	(pp.	 12–24).	 	 According	 to	 Ricks,	 this	 set	 of	 reforms	 would	 “panic-proof[]”	 the	 financial	 system	 and	 prevent	 the	 type	 of	 recessions	 that	leave	 lasting	 scars	 on	 a	 country’s	 economic	 health	 (p.	 3).	 	 Moreover,	
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––		 ∗	 Professor	of	Law,	Columbia	Law	School.	 	 I	am	grateful	to	Jeffrey	Gordon,	David	Skeel,	Scott	Hemphill,	 Eric	Hilt,	 and	 Patricia	Mosser	 for	 helpful	 comments	 and	 conversations,	 Francesca	 Co-cuzza	 and	 Catherine	Walsh	 for	 exceptional	 research	 assistance,	 and	 the	 editors	 of	 the	Harvard	
Law	Review	for	thoughtful	feedback	throughout	the	editing	process.	 	I	also	wish	to	thank	Morgan	Ricks,	whose	 thought-provoking	 book	 inspired	 this	 response	 and	with	whom	 I	 look	 forward	 to	decades	of	ongoing	debate.		 1	 Pub.	L.	No.	111-203,	124	Stat.	1376	(2010)	(codified	as	amended	in	scattered	sections	of	the	U.S.	Code).	
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this	approach	is	sufficiently	certain	to	work	that	the	government	could	roll	 back	 the	 myriad	 other	 financial	 regulations	 aimed	 at	 promoting	stability.	 	 Even	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 would	 be	 optional	 in	 the	 new	landscape	 that	 Ricks	 envisions	 (p.	 229).	 	 Regardless	 of	 whether	 one	buys	 into	 his	 proposed	 reforms	 —	 and	 let	 me	 state	 at	 the	 outset,	 I	don’t	—	 the	 book	makes	 a	 lasting	 contribution	 by	 demonstrating	 the	importance	of	money,	broadly	construed,	and	the	shortcomings	 inher-ent	 in	 the	 current	 academic	 and	 regulatory	 efforts	 to	 understand	 and	address	money	claims.	A	 virtue	 of	 the	 book’s	 reform	 proposal	 is	 the	way	 it	 brings	 to	 life	the	incredible	oddity	of	money	as	a	financial	asset.		According	to	Ricks,	the	 best	 way	 to	 promote	 financial	 stability	 is	 to	 allow	 banks	 to	 fund	themselves	 with	 debt	 from	 creditors	 who	 are	 indifferent	 to	 whether	the	 bank	 fails	 or	 succeeds.	 	 No	matter	 how	 large	 or	 sophisticated	 the	creditor,	so	long	as	maturity	of	its	claim	is	less	than	a	year,	Ricks	does	not	want	 that	 creditor	 to	 undertake	 any	 due	 diligence,	 engage	 in	 any	ongoing	 monitoring,	 or	 impose	 any	 discipline	 on	 the	 bank.2	 	 Those	roles	would	be	 left	 to	 the	bank’s	 shareholders	—	who	will	often	want	the	bank	to	assume	more	risk	 than	 is	socially	optimal	—	and	the	gov-ernment.	At	 first	 blush,	 many	 might	 agree	 with	 then–Treasury	 Secretary	Timothy	 Geithner,	 who	 described	 the	 author’s	 first	 iteration	 of	 the	idea	in	2009	as	“wacky”	(p.	xi).		In	most	financial	markets,	information	generation	and	discipline	are	the	types	of	activities	that	we	want	mar-ket	 actors,	 not	 government	 regulators,	 to	 undertake.	 	 In	 equity	 mar-kets,	 for	 example,	 stability	 is	 often	 assumed	 to	 flow	 from	 efficiency	and	promoting	private	information	generation	is	widely	viewed	as	the	optimal,	 even	 if	 imperfect,	 route	 to	 enhancing	 efficiency.3	 	 In	 this	frame,	intentionally	short-circuiting	market-based	information	produc-tion	 by	 making	 a	 firm’s	 debt	 insensitive	 to	 any	 kind	 of	 information	would	 seem	 like	 a	 recipe	 for	 disaster.	 	 And	 that’s	 before	 layering	 on	the	challenges	posed	by	the	contrary	interests	of	the	firm’s	sharehold-ers.	 	 Yet,	 Ricks	 argues	 thoughtfully,	 and	 at	 times	 quite	 persuasively,	that	this	is	the	best	way	to	achieve	financial	stability.	As	 Ricks	 shows,	 the	 assumptions	 that	 underlie	 corporate	 finance	have	only	limited	applicability	when	the	financial	asset	in	question	en-joys	 some	 degree	 of	 moneyness.	 	 Moneyness	 alters	 the	 premium	 a	holder	will	pay	for	a	claim	and	the	amount	of	due	diligence	the	holder	will	 undertake	 before	 acquiring	 the	 claim,	 rendering	 the	 efficiency-
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––		 2	 Ricks	would	allow,	but	not	require,	banks	to	obtain	funding	by	issuing	long-term	debt,	leav-ing	open	the	option,	but	no	obligation,	of	long-term	creditor	discipline.		 3	 E.g.,	 GARY	 B.	 GORTON,	MISUNDERSTANDING	 FINANCIAL	 CRISES	 48	 (2012);	 Ronald	 J.	 Gilson	&	Reinier	 H.	 Kraakman,	The	Mechanisms	 of	 Market	 Efficiency,	 70	 VA.	 L.	 REV.	 549	 (1984);	 Kathryn	Judge,	Information	Gaps	and	Shadow	Banking,	103	VA.	L.	REV.	(forthcoming	2017).	
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oriented	assumptions	underlying	standard	asset-pricing	models	 large-ly	 inapplicable	 to	money	 claims.4	 	At	 the	 same	 time,	when	 short-term	debt	 funds	 longer-term	 liabilities,	 a	 defining	 characteristic	 of	 banks	and	 much	 of	 the	 shadow	 banking	 system,	 the	 institutions	 that	 result	are	 inherently	 fragile.	 	 If	 money	 claimants	 withdraw	 their	 funds	 en	masse,	as	 they	do	 in	a	 run,	 the	 institution	 issuing	 those	claims	will	be	compelled	 to	 sell	 its	 relatively	 illiquid	 assets	 at	 discounted	 “fire-sale”	prices,	potentially	rendering	even	a	solvent	 institution	 insolvent.	 	This	fragility	alters	the	 incentives	of	money	claimants,	who	now	must	wor-ry	 about	 the	 behavior	 of	 their	 fellow	 claimants	 in	 addition	 to	 the	health	of	the	institution	issuing	their	claim,	setting	the	stage	for	finan-cial	 panics	 and	 the	deep	 recessions	 that	 often	 follow.	 	 Although	 these	insights	 are	 not	 new,	 The	 Money	 Problem	 demonstrates	 in	 new	 light	the	 importance	of	 recognizing	money	 as	 a	 type	of	 financial	 claim	 that	can	be	 readily	produced	by	private	mechanisms,	absent	a	prohibition,	and	one	that	poses	unique	public	policy	challenges.	 	This	 is	the	book’s	most	 important	contribution	and	 it	alone	 justifies	 the	undertaking,	 for	author	and	reader	alike.	Shifting	 from	the	author’s	 claim	 that	money	poses	a	distinct	policy	challenge	 to	his	proposed	 solution	 to	 that	 challenge	 reveals	 the	 limits	of	his	analysis.	 	His	claim	 in	 the	abstract	 is	 simple	and	appealing.	 	Be-cause	money	claims	created	in	the	shadow	banking	system	are	not	 in-sured	like	bank	deposits,	the	shadow	banking	system	is	more	prone	to	runs,	which	in	turn	inflict	lasting	damage	on	the	economy.		We	should,	accordingly,	 update	 and	 expand	 the	 banking	 system	 and	 prohibit	 any	money	 creation	 outside	 of	 that	 system.	 	 The	 details	 of	 the	 proposal,	however,	reveal	that	he	wants	to	significantly	expand,	not	 just	update,	traditional	 bank	 regulation.	 	 Ricks	 proposes	 a	 scheme	 of	 government	control	 over	 money	 creation	 and	 short-term	 debt	 that	 is,	 to	 my	knowledge,	 unprecedented	 in	 any	 advanced	 economy.5	 	 According	 to	Ricks,	 the	 government	 should	 significantly	 expand	 government-provided	insurance	to	cover	all	bank	deposits,	no	matter	how	large	the	deposit	 or	 how	 sophisticated	 the	 holder	 and	 irrespective	 of	 any	 sys-temic	threat.		The	government	should	also	limit	the	aggregate	deposits	that	 the	 system	 could	 create,	 control	 the	 terms	 pursuant	 to	 which	banks	 accept	 deposits,	 and	 prohibit	 virtually	 all	 private	 debt	 with	 a	maturity	of	less	than	a	year	—	no	more	traditional	money	market	mu-tual	 funds,	 sale	 and	 repurchase	 agreements	 (repos),	 or	 commercial	paper	(p.	226).	 	Despite	this	significant	expansion,	Ricks	contends	that	traditional	 bank	 regulatory	 tools	 will	 suffice	 to	 constrain	 bank	 risk	
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––		 4	 See	infra	Part	III.		 5	 See	infra	Part	I.	
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taking	and	counteract	 the	moral	hazard	and	other	distortions	 that	 the	massive	insurance	scheme	would	induce.	The	 breadth	 of	 Ricks’s	 proposal	 allows	 almost	 countless	 angles	 of	attack.	 	 Concerns	 could	 be	 raised	 on	 issues	 as	 diverse	 as	 operational	challenges	 (e.g.,	 could	 the	 government	 rely	 on	 market	 actors	 to	 pro-vide	 elasticity	when	 it	 is	most	 needed?),	 desirability	 (e.g.,	 how	would	the	proposal	impact	the	status	of	the	U.S.	dollar	as	the	reserve	curren-cy?),	 and	 political	 feasibility	 (e.g.,	 could	 the	 proposal	 overcome	 a	 sig-nificant	challenge	on	both	the	domestic	and	international	fronts?).6		As	a	 result,	 any	 assessment	 of	 The	 Money	 Problem	 is	 likely	 to	 reveal	 as	much	 about	 the	 person	 launching	 the	 critique	 as	 it	 does	 about	 the	book’s	strengths	and	shortcomings.	Rather	 than	 hiding	 from	 this	 fact,	 let	 me	 make	 my	 biases	 plain.		Ricks	 and	 I	 agree	 on	 a	 number	 of	 key	 issues.	 	 We	 both	 see	 shadow	banking	 as	 central	 to	 the	 Crisis.	 	 We	 agree	 that	 the	 shadow	 banking	system	 grew	 outside	 the	 direct	 purview	 of	 prudential	 regulators,	 and	that	 policymakers	 and	 other	 experts	 failed	 to	 appreciate	 its	 scope	 or	significance	 prior	 to	 the	 Crisis.	 	 We	 further	 agree	 that	 the	 shadow	banking	 system’s	 extensive	 reliance	 on	 short-term	 debt	 increases	 its	fragility,	 and	we	 are	 skeptical	 that	 the	 post-Crisis	 reforms	 adequately	address	 these	 challenges.	 	 On	 other	 issues,	 our	 biases	 diverge.	 	 To	grossly	 oversimplify,	 students	 of	 banking	 can	 be	 categorized	 into	 two	groups	—	one	that	views	banking	crises	as	primarily	the	byproduct	of	coordination	problems	and	a	second	 that	believes	crises	are	 triggered	by	information	and	the	fundamentals	that	information	conveys.7		Ricks	provides	 an	 alternative	 to	 the	 classic	 coordination-based	 theory	 (pp.	52–77),	 and	 I	 have	 my	 own	 alternative	 account	 of	 the	 ways	 that	 in-formation	and	 information	gaps	contribute	 to	 fragility.8	 	We	also	both	recognize	 that	 information	 and	 coordination	problems	 typically	 inter-act	 to	 produce	 crises.	 	 Nonetheless,	 Ricks	 assumes	 that	 the	 challenge	money	poses	is	primarily	a	coordination	game	and	that	banks	will	not	assume	 excess	 risk	 unless	 incentivized	 to	 do	 so	 by	 bad	 government	policies	 even	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 creditor	monitoring	 or	 discipline.9	 	 In	
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––		 6	 Ricks	recognizes	each	of	these	as	issues	(e.g.,	pp.	229,	239–40,	263).		 7	 See,	e.g.,	Franklin	Allen,	Ana	Babus	&	Elena	Carletti,	Financial	Crises:	Theory	and	Evidence,	1	ANN.	 REV.	 FIN.	 ECON.	97,	 99–100	 (2009)	 (“Academic	 research	 proposes	 two	 distinct	 theories	 to	explain	the	origins	of	banking	panics”	—	one	suggesting	“bank	runs	are	self-fulfilling	prophecies”	arising	 from	 coordination	 challenges,	 id.	 at	 99,	 and	 a	 second	 suggesting	 “crises	 are	 not	 random	events,	but	 responses	of	depositors	 to	 the	arrival	of	 sufficiently	negative	 information	on	 the	un-folding	economic	circumstances,”	id.	at	100.).		 8	 Judge,	 supra	 note	 3;	 Kathryn	 Judge,	 Essay,	The	 First	 Year:	 The	 Role	 of	 a	Modern	 Lender	 of	
Last	Resort,	116	COLUM.	L.	REV.	843	(2016)	[hereinafter	Judge,	The	First	Year].			 9	 See	 infra	Part	II.	 	This	assumption	is	reflected,	among	other	places,	 in	the	baseline	scenario	that	Ricks	uses	when	describing	the	way	certain	government	interventions	affect	bank	risk	taking	(Chapters	Six	&	Seven,	pp.	164–99).	
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contrast,	 I	 see	 information	as	 the	critical	 factor	distinguishing	periods	of	 stability	 from	 crises,	 and	 I	 view	 some	 private	 information	 produc-tion	and	 the	 threat	of	 creditor	discipline	as	helpful	 in	efforts	 to	main-tain	stability.10	For	related	reasons,	we	have	different	takes	on	the	history	of	bank-ing	and	bank	regulation,	 leading	to	very	different	views	on	the	capaci-ty	of	any	single	government	 intervention	 to	bring	about	 lasting	stabil-ity.11	 	 Ricks	 believes	 this	 is	 possible.	 	 In	 his	 assessment,	 the	 key	 is	ensuring	that	the	scope	of	government	control	and	the	complementary	prohibitions	 are	 sufficiently	 broad	 to	 shut	 down	 shadow	banking	 and	its	 kin.	 	 A	 very	 different	 lesson	 one	 could	 take	 from	 the	 growth	 of	shadow	banking	 and	 our	 collective	 blindness	 to	 it	 before	 the	 Crisis	 is	that	 the	 exceptional	 dynamism	of	 financial	markets	 ensures	 that	poli-cymakers	will	never	 succeed	 in	 identifying	and	addressing	all	 sources	of	systemic	instability	in	advance.		Shadow	banks	will	reappear,	in	one	form	 or	 another,	 and	 private	 money	 creation	 will	 emerge,	 whether	driven	 by	 insufficient	 authorized	 money	 or	 the	 high	 cost	 of	 holding	such	money.	 	A	 regulatory	 regime	 that	does	not	anticipate	 such	dyna-mism	 can	 itself	 inhibit	 the	 capacity	 of	 regulators	 to	 identify	 and	 re-spond	to	new	threats.		Taking	the	latter	view	leads	me	to	favor	a	regu-latory	 regime	 that	 is	 responsive	 rather	 than	 rigid	 and	 regulators	who	bring	 more	 humility	 than	 hubris	 to	 the	 challenge	 of	 identifying	 sys-temic	risks.12	These	 differences	make	me	 skeptical	 of	 Ricks’s	 proposal,	 but	 they	also	serve	as	a	lens	for	illuminating	valuable	insights	embedded	in	The	
Money	 Problem	 that	 can	 get	 lost	 in	 the	 author’s	 conviction	 regarding	his	 proposed	 reforms.	 	 A	 concrete	 example	 of	 a	 reform	measure	 that	builds	 on	 the	 book’s	 insights	 while	 addressing	 these	 concerns	 would	be	to	expand	and	clarify	the	situations	wherein	the	government	should	serve	 as	 an	 “insurer	 of	 last	 resort”	—	 providing	 broad	 guarantees	 to	money	 claimants	 to	 prevent	 runs	 in	 situations	 that	 pose	 a	 systemic	threat.	 	 This	 approach	 would	 provide	 many	 of	 the	 benefits	 of	 the	book’s	proposed	scheme	and	would	 frequently	be	more	effective	 than	the	 lender-of-last-resort	 interventions	often	used	in	such	circumstanc-es	 while	 still	 allowing	 market	 discipline	 to	 deter	 idiosyncratic	 risk-taking	outside	of	crisis	periods.13	This	Book	Review	proceeds	 in	 four	Parts.	 	 Part	 I	 provides	 context.		It	 explains	 why	 the	 book	 deserves	 to	 be	 widely	 read	 and	 discussed,	but	also	why	the	policy	prescription	that	serves	as	 its	backbone	ought	to	be,	and	probably	will	be,	 ignored.	 	Parts	 II	and	III	address	why	that	
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––		 10	 See	infra	Part	III.		 11	 See	infra	Part	IV.		 12	 See	infra	Part	IV.		 13	 See	infra	Part	IV.	
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reform	proposal	is	both	over-	and	underinclusive	by	situating	the	pro-posal	 in	 the	 literature	 on	 banking	 and	 money,	 respectively.	 	 Part	 IV	expands	 the	 focal	 point	 by	 providing	 a	 very	 different	 reading	 of	 the	history	 of	 financial	 panics	 and	 banking	 regulation,	 leading	 to	 a	 very	different	 set	 of	 conclusions	 about	 how	 best	 to	 address	 the	 challenges	that	shadow	banking	poses.	 I.		THE	BOOK	The	 Crisis	 started	 in	 August	 2007,	 when	 an	 announcement	 by	 a	French	bank	revealed	a	striking	lack	of	liquidity	in	the	market	for	sub-prime	 mortgage-backed	 securities	 (MBS)	 and	 raised	 questions	 about	the	 value	 of	 those	 instruments.14	 	 The	 announcement	 triggered	wide-spread	 market	 dysfunction,	 as	 holders	 of	 short-term	 debt	 backed	 by	subprime	MBS	and	other	 types	of	 structured	 financial	 instruments	ef-fectively	withdrew	 from	 these	markets.	 	With	 the	benefit	 of	 hindsight	and	 empirical	 investigation,	most	 experts	 now	 recognize	 these	 devel-opments	 and	 other	 significant	 turning	 points	 in	 the	 Crisis	 as	 runs	 on	the	 shadow	banking	 system.15	 	 Through	 a	 panoply	 of	 government	 in-terventions,	including	creative	new	uses	of	the	Federal	Reserve’s	lend-er-of-last-resort	 authority	 to	 increase	 market	 liquidity,	 capital	 injec-tions	 by	 the	 Treasury	 Department	 to	 improve	 the	 health	 of	 weak	financial	 institutions,	 information	 injections	 to	 enable	market	 partici-pants	 to	better	understand	 the	health	of	 those	 institutions,	and	an	ar-ray	 of	 government	 insurance	 programs,	 policymakers	 succeeded	 in	containing	the	Crisis	and	restoring	market	functioning.	 	Unfortunately,	the	 inflection	point	 that	put	 the	 system	back	on	a	path	 toward	 recov-ery	was	not	reached	until	well	after	the	Crisis	had	inflicted	significant,	and	potentially	lasting,	harm	on	the	real	economy.16	In	 early	 2009,	 well	 over	 a	 year	 into	 the	 Crisis	 and	 months	 after	Congress	 had	 granted	 financial	 regulators	 extraordinary	 new	 powers	to	rein	in	the	Crisis	but	when	regulators	were	still	experimenting	with	how	 best	 to	 use	 their	 expanded	 authority,	 Ricks	 joined	 the	 Treasury	Department.	 	 Coming	 in	 as	 a	 lawyer	 turned	 banker,	 Ricks	 was	 inti-mately	familiar	with	how	financial	markets	work	and	the	role	of	law	in	constituting	 the	 framework	 for	 those	 operations.	 	 It	 was	 during	 his	tenure	at	Treasury	that	Ricks	came	to	believe	that	the	best	way	to	con-
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––		 14	 See	Judge,	The	First	Year,	supra	note	8,	at	876–77.		 15	 See	Daniel	Covitz	et	al.,	The	Evolution	of	a	Financial	Crisis:	Collapse	of	the	Asset-Backed	
Commercial	Paper	Market,	68	J.	FIN.	815,	824	(2013);	Gary	Gorton	&	Andrew	Metrick,	Securitized	
Banking	and	the	Run	on	Repo,	104	J.	FIN.	ECON.	425	(2012).		 16	 For	 a	 thorough	overview	of	how	 the	Crisis	 evolved	 and	 the	myriad	 government	programs	aimed	at	reining	it	in,	see,	for	example,	FIN.	CRISIS	INQUIRY	COMM’N,	THE	FINANCIAL	CRISIS	INQUIRY	REPORT	(2011);	ANDREW	ROSS	SORKIN,	TOO	BIG	TO	FAIL	(2009).	
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tain	the	unfolding	financial	crisis	was	for	the	government	to	 insure	all	short-term	 debt	 in	 the	 financial	 system.	 	 He	 concedes	 that	 Geithner	dismissed	the	idea	and	that	his	proposal	failed	to	get	traction	even	in	a	period	of	great	regulatory	experimentation,	but	he	persisted.	 	Even	af-ter	he	left	Treasury	to	become	a	law	professor,	he	devoted	much	of	his	time	to	writing	multiple	papers	and	now	a	book	advancing	increasing-ly	sophisticated	and	nuanced	accounts	of	how	an	expansive	 insurance	scheme,	coupled	with	entry	and	risk	restrictions,	could	panic-proof	the	financial	system.17	These	 origins	 help	 to	 explain	 two	 of	 the	 book’s	 most	 important	contributions:	 its	 sweeping	 scope	 and	 its	 convincing	 argument	 that	understanding	the	type	of	 financial	claims	that	get	 treated	as	“money”	is	 central	 to	 promoting	 financial	 stability.	 	 Because	 Ricks	 spent	 so	many	 years	 promoting	 and	 refining	 his	 vision	 and	 engaged	 with	 so	many	academics	and	policymakers	 in	 the	process,	The	Money	Problem	seeks	 to	address	virtually	all	of	 the	challenges	one	could	 raise.	 	To	do	this,	 Ricks	 undertakes	 an	 expansive	 review	 of	 all-too-often	 disparate	bodies	 of	 literature.	 	 This	 undertaking	 aids	 the	 newbie	 just	 beginning	to	wade	into	these	waters,	but	it	also	enables	the	expert	to	see	familiar	ideas	through	a	new	lens.		Ricks’s	diverse	set	of	experiences,	combined	with	 his	 exceptional	 willingness	 and	 capacity	 to	 engage	 across	 disci-plines,	enables	him	to	provide	a	 fresh	perspective	on	 the	main	contri-butions	 and	 limits	 to	 the	 literature	 on	 financial	 regulation	 and	 how	that	literature	maps	onto	reality.		What	becomes	clear	from	his	review	is	 just	how	little	experts	of	any	stripe	really	know	about	 the	causes	of	financial	 fragility	and	the	mechanisms	through	which	that	 fragility	ad-versely	 affects	 the	 real	 economy.	 	 It	 is	 hard	not	 to	be	humbled	by	his	almost	inadvertent	revelation	that	all	that	we	have	“learned”	may	well	prove	to	be	wrong	and	that	shared	understandings	remain	frustrating-ly	elusive.	The	 book’s	 second	 core	 contribution	 is	 to	 demonstrate	 why	 the	questions	of	what	constitutes	money	and	how	money	shapes	 financial	markets	 are	 fundamental	 and	 all	 too	 often	 misunderstood.	 	 As	 Ricks	explains,	 “when	we	 talk	 about	 the	 liabilities	 of	 banking	 firms,	we	 are	not	 in	 a	 ‘corporate	 finance’	 world”	 where	 “the	 value	 of	 a	firm	.	.	.	equal[s]	.	.	.	the	 present	 value	 of	 the	 firm’s	 expected	 future	
cash	 flows”	 (p.	 79).	 	 Unlike	 other	 firms,	 banks	 and	 shadow	banks	 are	“issuers”	 of	 cash	 and	 cash	 equivalents	 and	 “applying	 standard	 corpo-rate	 finance	 principles	 to	 banks	 can	 lead	 to	 big	 mistakes”	 (p.	 79).		
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––		 17	 E.g.,	 Morgan	 Ricks,	 Regulating	 Money	 Creation	 After	 the	 Crisis,	 1	 HARV.	 BUS.	 L.	 REV.	 75	(2011);	Morgan	Ricks,	A	Regulatory	Design	 for	Monetary	Stability,	65	VAND.	L.	REV.	1289	(2012);	Morgan	Ricks,	Reforming	the	Short-Term	Funding	Markets	(Harvard	Law	Sch.	John	M.	Olin	Ctr.	for	Law,	 Econ.	 &	 Bus.,	 Discussion	 Paper	 No.	 713,	 2012),	https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2062334	[https://perma.cc/V7VS-3AUL].		
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Ricks	convincingly	demonstrates	 that	 financial	economists	are	not	 the	only	ones	to	assume	away	the	distinctiveness	of	money	claims	and	the	institutions	that	 issue	them	and	that	 in	doing	so,	academics	and	many	policymakers	 all	 too	 often	 assume	 away	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 issue	 in	 the	process.	 	Ricks’s	position	at	Treasury	afforded	him	a	front-row	seat	to	the	 ways	 that	 the	 structure	 of	 money	 claims	 and	 the	 incentives	 of	money	claimants	can	 lead	to	destructive	spirals	during	periods	of	sys-temic	 distress.	 	 He	 also	 convincingly	 argues	 that	 short-term	 debt	 has	long	 been	 the	 primary	 type	 of	 financial	 claim	 to	 be	 afforded	 money-like	 status	 (pp.	 29–49)	 and	 that,	 because	 of	 the	 distinct	 coordination	challenges	that	arise	when	short-term	liabilities	fund	long-term	assets,	such	claims	are	an	important	source	of	fragility	(pp.	52–73).		In	calling	for	 renewed	 and	 widened	 appreciation	 of	 the	 distinct	 importance	 of	money	 claims,	 the	 book	 makes	 a	 lasting	 contribution	 to	 the	 ongoing	efforts	to	understand	and	address	financial	fragility.	These	strengths	are	sufficient	to	make	the	book	an	important	addi-tion	 to	 the	 already	 sizeable	 literature	 on	 the	 Crisis,	 but	 they	 do	 not	immunize	 it	 from	 critique.	 	 I	 doubt	 I	 will	 be	 the	 only	 reader	 uncon-vinced	 that	Ricks	 has	 found	 the	magic	 bullet	 that	 can	 panic-proof	 the	financial	 system	 and	 prevent	 the	 most	 harmful	 recessions.	 	 Some	 of	the	issues	are	transitional.		As	Ricks’s	figures	attest,	there	is	more	than	$25	 trillion	 in	 short-term	 claims	 outstanding.	 	 The	 majority	 of	 these	claims,	 including	 Eurodollars	 issued	 overseas,	 commercial	 paper	 is-sued	by	 blue-chip	 companies,	 asset-backed	 commercial	 paper	 (ABCP)	sponsored	by	financial	institutions,	and	repos,	are	pervasive	in	today’s	financial	markets	 (p.	 33)	 and	would	 be	 prohibited	 under	 Ricks’s	 pro-posal.	 	Often,	 these	arrangements	 serve	as	 links	 in	much	 longer	 inter-mediation	 chains	 that	 fund	 an	 array	 of	 productive	 undertakings.18		Eliminating	 these	 arrangements	 would	 thus	 not	 only	 create	 a	 chal-lenge	 for	 the	 holders	 of	 the	 money	 claims	 at	 issue,	 but	 also	 require	that	the	underlying	projects	currently	funded	by	this	capital	either	de-velop	 alternative	mechanisms	 for	 accessing	 capital	 or	 remain	unfund-ed.	 	The	book	makes	no	effort	 to	quantify	 these	 costs,	with	 respect	 to	either	the	short-term	costs	of	radically	changing	significant	swathes	of	how	 the	 financial	 markets	 currently	 function	 or	 the	 long-term	 costs	that	 might	 result	 from	 reduced	 credit	 creation.	 	 Given	 the	 claim	 that	the	 proposed	 reforms	 would	 panic-proof	 the	 financial	 system	 and	eliminate	 severe	 recessions,	 the	 purported	 benefits	 may	 well	 justify	these	exceptional	costs,	but	one	would	need	 to	be	exceptionally	confi-dent	regarding	the	gains.	
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––		 18	 See,	 e.g.,	 TOBIAS	 ADRIAN	 &	 HYUN	 SONG	 SHIN,	 FED.	 RESERVE	 BANK	 OF	 N.Y.,	 THE	 CHANGING	NATURE	OF	FINANCIAL	INTERMEDIATION	AND	THE	FINANCIAL	CRISIS	OF	2007–09,	at	4	(2010).	
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The	 second	 set	 of	 issues	 relates	 to	 how	markets	 would	 evolve	 in	response.	 	 According	 to	 Ricks,	 the	 government	 should:	 set	 an	 explicit	cap	 on	 the	 aggregate	 deposits	 in	 the	 banking	 system	 (p.	 228);	 dictate	that	 all	 deposits	 earn	 0%	 interest,	 irrespective	 of	 whether	 prevailing	interest	rates	are	negative	or	the	country	is	mired	in	inflation	(p.	224);	prohibit	 any	 other	 entity	 from	 accepting	 deposits	 or	 issuing	 any	 debt	with	 a	maturity	 of	 less	 than	 a	 year,	with	 some	modest	 carve-outs	 for	trade	 credit	 and	 other	 de	minimis	 exceptions	 (pp.	 17,	 226);	 and	 fully	insure	all	deposits	 (p.	224).	 	The	centerpiece	of	 this	plan	 is	 the	 insur-ance	 component,	 which	 is	 designed	 to	 prevent	 depositors	 from	 ever	running.	 	 The	 government	 would	 commit,	 ex	 ante,	 to	 insure	 all	 out-standing	money	 claims,	 irrespective	of	 size	 and	 regardless	 of	 how	 so-phisticated	 the	holder.	 	Moreover,	 full	 government	backing	would	not	be	limited	to	situations	when	the	banking	(or	shadow	banking)	system	as	a	whole	might	otherwise	collapse,	but	would	be	fully	provided	in	all	states	of	the	world.19	To	address	 the	moral	hazard	and	adverse	selection	 that	 this	broad	insurance	 scheme	would	 induce,	 Ricks	 relies	 on	 familiar	 bank	 regula-tory	tools,	 like	activities	restrictions	and	capital	requirements	—	tools	with	 a	 decidedly	mixed	 track	 record	 of	 success.20	 	 This	 is	 why	 other	advocates	 of	 safe	 banking	—	 of	which	 there	 have	 been	many	—	 rou-tinely	 insist	 that	 we	 must	 fundamentally	 change	 the	 nature	 of	 bank-ing.21	 	 Austrian	 economist	 Ludwig	 von	 Mises,	 Chicago	 School	 econo-mists	 like	 Professors	 Irving	 Fisher	 and	 Milton	 Friedman,	 and	contemporary	academics	 like	Professors	Laurence	Kotlikoff	and	Adam	Levitin	have	all	championed	some	form	of	full-reserve	banking.22		Like	Ricks,	 these	scholars	emphasize	the	virtues	of	a	“panic-proof”	banking	system	and	greater	 government	 control	 over	monetary	 creation.23	 	 In	stark	 contrast	 to	 Ricks,	 however,	 each	 assumes	 that	 the	 only	 way	 to	
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––		 19	 Cf.	GORTON,	supra	note	3,	at	124	(“Courts,	 legislatures,	and	Congress	 .	.	.	have	distinguished	between	normal	times	and	times	of	crisis,	and	have	not	enforced	bank-debt	contracts	in	times	of	crisis.”);	MERVYN	KING,	THE	END	OF	ALCHEMY:	MONEY,	BANKING,	AND	THE	FUTURE	OF	THE	GLOBAL	ECONOMY	 264	 (2016)	 (“[O]ne	 role	 of	 governments	 is	 to	 provide	 catastrophic	 insurance	 when	something	wholly	unexpected	happens.”).		 20	 For	an	overview	of	the	costs	of	deposit	insurance,	see	generally	Charles	W.	Calomiris	&	Mat-thew	Jaremski,	Deposit	Insurance:	Theories	and	Facts	(Columbia	Bus.	Sch.,	Research	Paper	No.	16-35,	 2016),	 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2771346	[https://perma.cc/7JWT-6Z6X].		 21	 See	 Morgan	 Ricks,	 Safety	 First?	 The	 Deceptive	 Allure	 of	 Full	 Reserve	 Banking,	 83	 U.	 CHI.	 L.	REV.	 ONLINE	 113	 (2016),	https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/sites/lawreview.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/Dialogue/Ricks_FINAL.pdf	[https://perma.cc/MDT3-DS9U]	(recognizing	the	long	and	illustrious	history	of	“call[s]	for	full	reserve	banking”).		 22	 Id.;	see	also	MARTIN	WOLF,	THE	SHIFTS	AND	THE	SHOCKS:	WHAT	WE’VE	LEARNED	—	AND	HAVE	STILL	TO	LEARN	—	FROM	THE	FINANCIAL	CRISIS	206–07,	209–11	(2014).		 23	 WOLF,	supra	note	22,	at	206–07,	209–11.	
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ensure	banks	are	 truly	safe	 is	 to	eliminate	 the	 liquidity	mismatch	that	renders	banks	fragile.24		While	the	proposals	vary	in	the	specifics,	each	requires	 banks	 to	 hold	 only	 safe	 and	 liquid	 assets.	 	 In	 Ricks’s	 view,	such	 proposals	 are	 grounded	 on	 a	 false	 dichotomy	 —	 that	 we	 must	choose	 between	 a	 panic-proof	 banking	 system,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	one	 that	 allows	 banks	 to	 engage	 in	 credit,	 maturity,	 and	 liquidity	transformation	 and	 that	 enables	 them	 to	 assume	 other	 risks,	 on	 the	other.		According	to	Ricks,	we	can	have	both.25		Moreover,	Ricks	 is	sufficiently	confident	 that	his	proposed	reforms	will	 panic-proof	 the	 financial	 system,	 and	 that	 panics	 are	 the	 critical	factor	explaining	the	most	damaging	recessions,	that	he	would	allow	a	significant	 rollback	 of	 the	 myriad	 other	 policies	 currently	 in	 place	 to	promote	 financial	 stability.	 	 By	 adopting	 his	 proposed	 reforms,	 “we	could	worry	 far	 less	 about	 a	 lot	 of	 other	 things”	 that	 other	 academics	and	 policymakers	 view	 as	 critical	 to	 financial	 stability	 and	 economic	health,	 including	 “‘excessive	 debt,’	.	.	.	‘excessive	 risk	 taking,’	.	.	.	‘too	big	to	fail,’	 ‘interconnectedness,’	[and]	‘systemic	risk’”	(p.	24).		In	more	concrete	 terms,	 this	means	 that	 “securities	 firms	 and	 other	 nonbanks	might	 be	 given	 free	 rein	 to	 engage	 in	 structured	 finance,	 derivatives,	proprietary	trading,	and	so	forth”	(p.	25).		The	proposal	thus	envisions	a	 massive	 expansion	 of	 the	 government’s	 role	 in	 the	 production	 of	short-term	debt	and	the	oversight	of	banks	and	a	significant	reduction	in	the	government’s	footprint	elsewhere	in	the	financial	markets.		Ricks’s	position	is	cohesive,	elegant,	and	enticing,	making	it	a	great	starting	point	 for	debate.	 	He	affirms	the	widely	acknowledged	but	 in-sufficiently	 addressed	 threats	 posed	 by	 shadow	 banking	 and	 short-term	financing,	and	he	demonstrates	the	advantages	of	using	structur-al	 reforms	 to	 address	 these	 challenges.26	 	 Nonetheless,	 his	 proposal	
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––		 24	 Id.		 25	 To	be	sure,	Ricks	downplays	the	role	of	banks	as	financial	intermediaries	in	his	regime	and	suggests	 that	 they	will	 be	 allowed	 to	 hold	 only	 diversified	 assets	 that	 pose	 limited	 risk,	 but	 he	also	recognizes	 that	“the	risk	constraints	need	to	be	permissive	enough	to	accommodate	the	de-sired	money	supply”	(p.	16).		 26	 See,	e.g.,	Ben	S.	Bernanke,	Chairman,	Bd.	of	Governors	of	 the	Fed.	Reserve	Sys.,	Remarks	at	the	49th	Annual	Conference	on	Bank	Structure	and	Competition:	Monitoring	the	Financial	System	(May	 10,	 2013),	 http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20130510a.htm	[https://perma.cc/RG4D-NS99]	 (“The	 crisis	 revealed	 that	 [the	 short-term]	 funding	 [relied	on	by	many	 broker-dealers]	 is	 potentially	 quite	 fragile	 if	 lenders	 have	 limited	 capacity	 to	 analyze	 the	collateral	 or	 counterparty	 risks	 associated	 with	 short-term	 secured	 lending,	 but	 rather	 look	 at	these	transactions	as	nearly	risk	free.”);	William	C.	Dudley,	President	and	Chief	Exec.	Officer,	Fed.	Reserve	 Bank	 of	 N.Y.,	 Remarks	 at	 the	 New	 York	 Bankers	 Association’s	 2013	 Annual	Meeting	 &	Economic	 Forum:	 Fixing	 Wholesale	 Funding	 to	 Build	 a	 More	 Stable	 Financial	 System	 (Feb.	 1,	2013),	 https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2013/dud130201	[https://perma.cc/7MMK-G9NK]	(identifying	 “the	extensive	use	of	 short-term	wholesale	 funding	in	the	years	leading	up	to	the	crisis”	as	a	“serious	flaw[]	in	the	system”);	Daniel	K.	Tarullo,	Gover-nor,	Bd.	of	Governors	of	the	Fed.	Reserve	Sys.,	Remarks	at	the	Distinguished	Jurist	Lecture	at	the	University	 of	 Pennsylvania	 Law	 School:	 Financial	 Stability	 Regulation	 (Oct.	 10,	 2012),		
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never	escapes	the	core	challenge	that	 if	he	 is	wrong	 in	his	assessment	of	 the	 problem	 or	 the	 sufficiency	 of	 his	 solution,	 his	 path	 to	 reform	may	prove	to	be	 little	more	than	an	alternative	route	to	disaster.	 	Nor	does	he	adequately	address	the	potential	adverse	effects	on	credit	cre-ation	 and	 economic	 growth.	 	 Ultimately,	 following	 an	 illustrious	 aca-demic	tradition,	Ricks	succeeds	not	by	providing	the	right	answer,	but	by	 asking	 the	 right	 questions,	 showing	 what	 is	 at	 stake,	 and	 laying	bare	the	inadequacies	of	the	understandings	developed	thus	far.		The	 remainder	 of	 this	Book	Review	 engages	more	 deeply	with	 as-pects	of	the	book’s	analysis	to	clarify	and	to	build	on	its	contributions.		The	 striking	 fact	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 book	 is	 the	massive	 growth	 and	size	 of	 the	market	 for	 short-term	 debt.	 	 The	 aggregate	 volume	 of	 the	instruments	 Ricks	 identifies	 as	money	 claims	 grew	 at	 an	 average	 an-nualized	 rate	 of	 9.3%	 from	1995	 to	 2007,	 and	has	 continued	 to	 grow	since	 the	 Crisis	 (p.	 33).27	 	 As	 a	 result,	 in	 2013,	 the	 total	 volume	 out-standing	stood	well	in	excess	of	$25	trillion	(p.	33).		Even	though	these	figures	 entail	 some	 double	 counting,	 given	 the	 inherent	 fragility	 of	short-term	 funding	 arrangements,	 the	 growth	 and	 size	 of	 these	 mar-kets	beg	the	question	of	why.	 	By	addressing	the	benefits	of	such	debt	for	 both	 the	 issuers	 and	 the	 holders,	 Parts	 II	 and	 III	 provide	 comple-mentary	accounts	of	 the	 reasons	 for	 this	 growth.	 	By	 situating	Ricks’s	work	in	the	broader	literature	on	banking	and	the	functions	of	money,	respectively,	 these	 Parts	 suggest	 that	 Ricks’s	 proposal	 is	 both	 over-	and	underinclusive,	but	they	also	reveal	how	his	insights	could	lay	the	foundation	for	an	alternative	path	to	reform.	II.		ELIMINATING	PRIVATE	SHORT-TERM	DEBT	Ricks	 groups	 the	 banking	 literature	 into	 three	 strands,	 each	 of	which	 offers	 a	 different	 answer	 to	 the	 question	 of	 why	 banks	 have	long	 relied	 on	 short-term	 debt	 as	 a	 major	 source	 of	 financing.	 	 One	theory,	promulgated	by	economists	like	Professor	Gary	Gorton,	focuses	on	the	distinct	utility	of	“information	insensitive”	financial	instruments	for	 the	 holders	 of	 those	 instruments	 and	why	 the	 structure	 of	 banks	makes	them	well	suited	to	issue	such	instruments	(pp.	83–85).28		A	se-cond,	 endorsed	 by	 economists	 like	 Professors	 Charles	 Calomiris	 and	Douglas	 Diamond,	 suggests	 that	 short-term	 debt	 serves	 as	 a	 commit-
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––	https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20121010a.htm	[https://perma.cc/3WXH-WV5D]	(explaining	that	“[t]he	vulnerability	of	shadow	banking	to	runs,	as	investors	rapidly	withdraw	funding,	can	lead	to	systemic	problems”).		 27	 Ricks	 includes	all	dollar-denominated	short-term	debt,	excluding	trade	debt,	wherever	it	 is	issued	(pp.	32–33).		 28	 Ricks	 characterizes	 this	 as	 the	 “information	 asymmetry	 theory”	 of	 banking	 (p.	 83),	 a	 term	not	used	here	as	information	asymmetries	are	also	fundamental	to	the	view	that	short-term	debt	can	serve	a	useful	disciplinary	function.	
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ment	device	that	can	helpfully	reduce	particular	agency	costs	(pp.	81–83).	 	 The	 third,	 first	 formalized	 by	 Professors	 Douglas	 Diamond	 and	Philip	 Dybvig,	 assumes	 that	 the	 short-term	 debt	 that	 banks	 issue	serves	as	a	form	of	liquidity	insurance,	while	focusing	on	bank	fragility	as	 an	 unfortunate	 by-product	 of	 coordination	 challenges	 that	 arise	when	 short-term	 liabilities	 are	 used	 to	 fund	 long-term,	 illiquid	 assets	(pp.	85–89).	 	Ricks	embraces	a	variation	on	the	third	and	suggests	de-ficiencies	 in	 the	 first	 two.	 	 In	 his	 view,	 “market	 discipline”	 in	 money	markets	“is	just	another	name	for	runs	and	panics”	(p.	201).	A	 primary	way	 that	 Ricks	 seeks	 to	 discredit	 the	 first	 two	 theories	of	 banking	 is	 by	 claiming	 that	 the	 two	 theories	 are	 fundamentally	 in-compatible.	 	 According	 to	 Ricks,	 “[i]f	 you	 buy	 one	 of	 these	 theories,	there	 is	 no	 buying	 the	 other”	 (p.	 84).	 	 Going	 to	 the	models	 animating	these	 theories,	 however,	 suggests	 a	 more	 complicated	 dynamic	 and	sheds	 light	 on	 some	 drawbacks	 of	 following	 the	 book’s	 proposal	 to	eliminate	private	short-term	debt.	Professors	 Gary	 Gorton	 and	 George	 Pennacchi	 introduced	 the	 no-tion	of	information	sensitivity	to	show	that	financial	claims	vary	in	the	degree	to	which	the	value	of	the	assets	underlying	a	financial	claim	af-fects	 the	 value	 of	 the	 claim.29	 	 Gorton	 and	 Pennacchi’s	 key	 insight	 is	that	 financial	 claims	 can	 be	 structured	 to	 reduce	 the	 ramifications	 of	information	asymmetries	among	 traders.30	 	 If,	 for	example,	a	 financial	claim	is	a	debt	claim	and	information	known	to	all	suffices	to	establish	that	the	value	of	the	underlying	assets	far	exceeds	the	face	value	of	the	claim,	traders	with	more	accurate	information	about	the	value	of	those	assets	cannot	profit	at	 the	expense	of	 less	 informed	traders.	 	Thus	 if	a	bank	has	$100	in	demand	deposits	outstanding	and	the	value	of	its	as-sets	is	widely	known	to	be	between	$120	and	$150,	depositors	do	not	have	 any	 reason	 to	 worry	 about	 the	 precise	 value	 of	 those	 assets.		More	accurate	information	is	pertinent	to	the	value	of	the	bank’s	equi-ty,	but	 the	value	of	 the	deposits	 is	not	affected.31	 	Deposits	 thus	serve	as	a	useful	store	of	value	for	relatively	uninformed	traders.32	This	value	arises	precisely	because	 the	claims	are	privately	 issued,	and	 thus	not	 truly	 risk-free	 or	 entirely	 insensitive	 to	 information.	 	As	Gorton	 has	 explained	 in	 subsequent	 work,	 “it	 is	 not	 possible	 for	 the	private	 sector	 to	produce	 riskless	 collateral,”	 and	all	privately	 created	money	is	vulnerable	to	runs	should	“depositors	suspect	problems	with	
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––		 29	 Gary	Gorton	&	George	Pennacchi,	Financial	 Intermediaries	and	Liquidity	Creation,	45	 J.	FIN.	49	(1990).			 30	 Id.	at	50.		 31	 These	examples	deviate	somewhat	from	Gorton	and	Pennacchi’s	original	analysis,	but	illus-trate	their	core	insight.	 	The	simplified	example	given	here	also	puts	aside	the	important	consid-eration,	incorporated	into	their	model,	of	uncertainty	with	respect	to	liquidity	demand.		 32	 See	infra	Part	IV	for	additional	reasons	why	such	claims	might	be	useful.	
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the	collateral.”33		Framed	in	terms	of	the	banking	example,	a	depositor	should	be	 indifferent	to	 information	about	whether	the	underlying	as-sets	are	worth	something	closer	to	$120	than	$150,	but	highly	respon-sive	 to	 any	 signal	 that	 casts	 doubt	 on	 that	 range,	 such	 as	 a	 pending	macroeconomic	 contraction	or	 indications	 that	 a	bank	manager	 is	 en-gaging	in	fraud.		Information	insensitivity	has	thus	always	been	a	term	of	 art,	 not	 a	 literal	 characterization	 of	 the	 financial	 claims	 at	 issue.		Even	 “information	 insensitive”	 claims	 are	 highly	 sensitive	 to	 some	types	of	information.34	Turning	 to	 the	work	on	 the	value	of	short-term	creditor	discipline,	two	 models	 merit	 attention.35	 	 The	 first,	 set	 forth	 by	 Professors	Charles	Calomiris	and	Charles	Kahn,	shows	that	bank	managers	 facing	the	 threat	 of	 immediate	 liquidation	 in	 the	 event	 that	 monitoring	 de-positors	detect	bad	behavior	are	less	likely	to	engage	in	malfeasance.36		Calomiris	 and	Kahn	 assume	 that	 bank	managers	 have	 “a	 comparative	advantage	in	allocating	funds	for	investment,	but	.	.	.	also	may	have	the	ability	 to	 act	 against	 the	 interests	 of	 uninformed	 depositors.”37	 	 They	demonstrate	 how	 banks’	 reliance	 on	 demandable	 debt	 operates	 in	connection	with	the	sequential	servicing	restraint	—	which	causes	de-positors	who	withdraw	early	 to	 fare	better	 than	 those	who	withdraw	late	—	to	incentivize	some	depositors	to	monitor	bankers.		Runs	occur	when	a	sufficient	proportion	of	monitoring	depositors	believe	a	bank’s	managers	are	engaged	in	malfeasance.38		Short-term	debt	thus	enables	bankers	 to	 signal	 information	 that	 they	 could	 not	 readily	 convey	through	other	means,	making	it	easier	for	banks	to	attract	depositors.	In	 the	second	model	 that	merits	attention,	Professors	Douglas	Dia-mond	and	Raghuram	Rajan	assume	 that	 loans	are	 illiquid,	 in	part,	be-cause	a	banker’s	skill	 is	required	to	fully	realize	the	value	of	outstand-ing	loans	and	bankers	cannot	commit	to	use	their	skill	to	maximize	the	value	 of	 a	 loan	 while	 simultaneously	 promising	 the	 returns	 on	 that	
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––		 33	 GORTON,	supra	note	3,	at	9.		 34	 Gorton	 has,	 in	 subsequent	work,	 launched	 a	more	 full-throated	 defense	 of	 the	 notion	 that	bank	debt	is	and	should	remain	completely	insensitive	to	information.		See,	e.g.,	Tri	Vi	Dang,	Gary	Gorton,	Bengt	Holmström	&	Guillermo	Ordoñez,	Banks	as	Secret	Keepers	37	(Nat’l	Bureau	of	Econ.	Research,	Working	 Paper	No.	 20255,	 2014);	 Tri	 Vi	 Dang,	 Gary	 Gorton	&	Bengt	Holmström,	 The	Information	Sensitivity	of	a	Security	(Mar.	2015)	(unpublished	manuscript)	(on	file	with	the	Har-vard	 Law	 School	 Library).	 	 The	 notion	 that	 bank	 debt	 should	 remain	 information	 insensitive	 is	not,	however,	core	to	the	notion	of	 information	sensitivity	as	commonly	used	by	others,	nor	 is	 it	inherent	in	Gorton	and	Pennacchi’s	original	theory	for	short-term	debt.			 35	 Another	vein	in	the	literature	highlights	how	reliance	on	short-term	financing	can	serve	as	a	signaling	 device.	 	 See,	 e.g.,	 Jeremy	 C.	 Stein,	Why	 Are	Most	 Funds	 Open-End?	 Competition	 and	 the	
Limits	of	Arbitrage,	120	Q.J.	ECON.	247	(2005).			 36	 Charles	W.	Calomiris	&	Charles	M.	Kahn,	The	Role	of	Demandable	Debt	 in	 Structuring	Opti-
mal	Banking	Arrangements,	81	AM.	ECON.	REV.	497,	509–10	(1991).			 37	 Id.	at	500.		 38	 See	id.	
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loan	 to	a	new	creditor.39	 	By	giving	creditors	 the	ability	 to	exit	 imme-diately	should	a	banker	engage	in	opportunistic	behavior,	demandable	debt	 solves	 this	 challenge,	 enabling	 banks	 to	 borrow	 against	 the	 full	value	of	the	loans	they	hold	and	to	offer	better	terms	on	the	loans	they	extend.40	 	The	model	 thus	shows	how	the	 fragile	nature	of	banks	may	“enhanc[e]	the	returns	from	real	assets	over	and	above	what	would	be	available	if	investors	tried	to	manage	them	directly.”41		Significantly,	in	both	 models,	 it	 is	 the	 threat	 of	 a	 possible	 run,	 not	 runs	 themselves,	that	brings	about	the	value-creating	change	in	behavior.42	Clearly,	 there	 is	 tension	between	the	notion	 that	money	claims	are	valuable	because	they	limit	the	amount	of	due	diligence	a	holder	must	undertake	 and	 the	notion	 that	money	 claimants	 impose	 informed,	 so-cially	useful	discipline.		The	assertion	that	one	cannot	“buy”	both	theo-ries	of	banking,	however,	goes	too	far	—	an	assumption	that	some	de-positors	 engage	 in	 some	monitoring	 and	 thus	 have	 some	 information	about	 bank	 activities	 and	 investments	 can	 be	 reconciled	 with	 each.		Such	 an	 assumption	may	 also	 help	 to	 explain	why	 government	 insur-ance	 schemes	 typically	 insure	 only	 smaller	 deposits,	 leaving	 large	 de-positors	 that	 are	 better	 positioned	 to	 discipline	 banks	 potentially	 ex-posed.	 	 And	 it	 is	 consistent	 with	 Ricks’s	 own	 depiction	 of	 money	claimants	 as	persons	who	 rely	on	proxies	 and	other	devices	 that	pro-vide	them	some,	but	 incomplete,	 information	about	the	 institutions	 is-suing	their	claims	(pp.	212–15).	A	better	way	 to	understand	 the	relationship	among	 these	 theories,	including	 the	 coordination	 dynamics	 that	 Ricks	 embraces,	 is	 not	 as	competing	 visions	 that	 demand	 full	 buy-in,	 but	 as	 incomplete	 truths,	each	 of	 which	 illuminates	 aspects	 of	 the	 short-term	 debt	market	 and	the	 intermediation	system	 that	market	 feeds.	 	This	 revised	 framing	 il-luminates	 the	value	of	 the	book’s	 critique	while	 also	bringing	 into	 re-lief	some	significant	drawbacks	of	the	proposed	reforms.	On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 book	 reveals	 significant	 shortcomings	 in	 the	policy	 recommendations	 frequently	 made	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 models	just	described.	 	As	Ricks	emphasizes,	coordination	challenges	accentu-ate	the	fragility	of	institutions	that	use	short-term	debt	to	fund	longer-term	assets.		When	such	an	institution	faces	excess	withdrawals,	it	can	be	 forced	 to	 sell	 assets	 at	 discounted,	 fire-sale	 prices,	 potentially	 ren-dering	 even	 a	 healthy	 institution	 insolvent.	 	 Moreover,	 as	 Ricks	 saw	
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––		 39	 Douglas	W.	Diamond	&	Raghuram	G.	Rajan,	Liquidity	Risk,	Liquidity	Creation,	and	Financial	
Fragility:	A	Theory	of	Banking,	109	J.	POL.	ECON.	287,	322–23	(2001).		 40	 See	id.	at	317.		 41	 Id.	at	320.			 42	 Cf.	JOSEPH	A.	SCHUMPETER,	CAPITALISM,	SOCIALISM,	AND	DEMOCRACY	85	(3d	ed.	2008)	(“[The	threat	of	disruptive	innovations]	acts	not	only	when	in	being	but	also	when	it	 is	merely	an	ever-present	threat.		It	disciplines	before	it	attacks.”).	
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firsthand	 during	 his	 time	 at	 Treasury,	 widespread	 runs	 can	 reduce	credit	creation	and	have	other	deleterious	effects	on	the	real	economy.		These	 costs	 are	 acknowledged	but	not	 incorporated	 into	 the	accounts	highlighting	 the	 informational	 and	 disciplinary	 virtues	 of	 short-term	debt,	 leading	 to	 inaccurate	 assertions,	 like	 claims	 that	 more	 market	discipline	 will	 necessarily	 lead	 to	 better	 outcomes	 or	 that	 the	 use	 of	short-term	debt	is	always	welfare	justified.	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 recognizing	 the	 large	 costs	 associated	 with	short-term	discipline	 is	a	 far	cry	 from	dismissing	 its	utility	altogether.		As	 the	 formal	models	 reflect,	 the	primary	benefit	 of	market	discipline	is	the	way	that	the	threat	of	a	run	alters	information	dynamics	and	in-centives.	 	 A	 bank	 manager	 who	 anticipates	 that	 malfeasance	 or	 lazi-ness	 could	 lead	 to	 a	 run	 has	 fundamentally	 different	 incentives	 than	one	 who	 does	 not	 face	 such	 a	 risk,	 and	 money	 claimants	 know	 this.		Ricks’s	 proposed	 reforms	would	 not	 only	 protect	money	 claimants	 in	the	event	of	a	run	on	the	system;	they	would	also	shield	money	claim-ants	 from	any	 loss	 even	when	an	 institution	 fails	 for	 entirely	 idiosyn-cratic	 reasons	 and	poses	 no	 systemic	 threat.	 	Money	 claimants	would	thus	have	no	reason	to	care	about	whether	bank	managers	are	assum-ing	 excessive	 risk	 or	 engaging	 in	 malfeasance.	 	 And	 bank	 managers,	aware	 of	 money	 claimants’	 indifference,	 would	 have	 limited	 tools	 to	precommit	or	signal	an	intention	toward	honesty	and	hard	work.	 	One	need	 not	 romanticize	 the	 distinct	 benefits	 of	 short-term	 discipline	 to	believe	 that	 financial	 institutions	are	more	risk	averse	when	they	 face	the	 possibility	 of	 a	 run	 than	 they	 would	 be	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 that	threat.	Given	 the	 social	 costs	 of	 runs,	 unfettered	 market	 discipline	 may	well	 lead	to	socially	suboptimal	outcomes,	but	 ignoring	the	benefits	of	creditor	 discipline	 is	 no	more	 likely	 to	 lead	 to	 the	 optimal	 policy	 re-sponse	than	ignoring	the	costs.	 	Runs	are	the	exception,	not	the	norm.		One	reason	that	 the	scope	and	 fragility	of	 the	shadow	banking	system	went	 under	 the	 radar	 pre-Crisis	 was	 that	 the	 system	 had	 been	 rela-tively	 stable	 during	 decades	 of	 growth	 despite	 its	 heavy	 reliance	 on	short-term	 debt.43	 	 The	 same	 was	 true	 for	 banks,	 even	 before	 they	were	 heavily	 regulated,	 except	 in	 situations	 when	 money	 claimants	
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––		 43	 See,	e.g.,	Jonathan	Macey,	Reducing	Systemic	Risk:	The	Role	of	Money	Market	Mutual	Funds	as	
Substitutes	 for	 Federally	 Insured	Bank	Deposits	 18–28	 (Yale	 Law	 Sch.	 Faculty	 Scholarship	 Series,	Paper	No.	 2020,	 2011)	 (using	 the	 performance	 of	money	market	 funds	 prior	 to	 and	 during	 the	crisis	 to	 illustrate	 the	 benefits	 of	market	 discipline	 coupled	with	 regulation	 but	 no	 government	insurance).	
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had	 reasons	 to	be	 concerned	about	 the	health	of	 the	 institutions	 issu-ing	those	claims.44	Letting	 go	 of	 assumptions	 that	 short-term	debt	 is	 always	 or	 never	useful	or	that	short-term	creditors	are	fully	 informed	or	entirely	 igno-rant	 reveals	 rocky	 terrain.	 	 There	 is	 no	 easy	 way	 to	 assess	 how	 the	mere	threat	of	discipline	affects	risk	taking	within	the	array	of	private	institutions	 that	 produce	 money-like	 claims	 or	 how	 it	 impacts	 the	monitoring	performed	by	those	who	hold	such	claims.		Nonetheless,	in	revealing	tensions	among	prevailing	theories	and	juxtaposing	the	real-ities	 of	 the	 market	 with	 those	 theories,	 the	 book	 demonstrates	 that	these	 are	 the	 questions	 that	must	 be	 asked.	 	 It	 also	 suggests	 that	 de-veloping	 a	 richer	 understanding	 of	 the	 information	 environment	 sur-rounding	 the	 issuance	 of	 short-term	 debt,	 how	 the	 information	 and	disciplinary	dynamics	vary	across	the	myriad	institutions	that	current-ly	 issue	short-term	debt,	and	how	those	realities	map	onto	 theory	are	important	 threshold	 issues	 that	must	 be	 addressed	 to	 devise	 a	 viable	plan	to	reform	these	markets.	III.		SHORT-TERM	DEBT	AS	MONEY	A	 different	way	 of	 approaching	 the	 questions	 of	why	money	mar-kets	 have	 gotten	 so	 large	 and	 how	 the	 market	 will	 likely	 respond	 to	the	 proposed	 reforms	 is	 to	 consider	 the	 demand	 side	 of	 the	 equation	—	who	wants	 to	hold	money	claims	and	why?	 	To	do	 this,	 let	us	 con-sider	what	would	happen	if	the	proposal	were	adopted.	 	A	person	that	had	been	holding	a	privately	issued	short-term	claim	would	have	three	options:	 (1)	pay	the	higher	price	 to	continue	to	hold	even	safer	short-term	debt;	 (2)	acquire	 longer-term	assets	 that	have	meaningful	 credit	and	 other	 risks,	 undertake	 the	 due	 diligence	 required	 to	 understand	those	risks,	and	accept	the	variability	that	might	result;	or	(3)	seek	out	viable	 but	 imperfect	 substitutes	 for	 short-term	 debt,	 that	 is,	 other	types	of	money-like	claims.		The	book	covers	both	the	first	and	second.		The	 interesting	 question	 is	 what	 types	 of	 instruments	might	 fall	 into	category	three.	Note	 that	 the	 issue	 here	 is	 not	 one	 of	 pure	 regulatory	 arbitrage.		One	 of	 the	 virtues	 of	 the	 author’s	 background	 as	 both	 lawyer	 and	banker	 is	 that	he	understands	how	one	could	cloak	an	effective	short-term	debt	 instrument	 in	other	clothes	and	he	knows	how	to	craft	 lan-guage	 to	 foreclose	 such	 efforts.	 	 The	 book	 even	 includes	 impressively	thorough	 proposed	 legislation	 (pp.	 243-45).	 	 Ricks	 is	 not	 about	 to	 al-low	 a	 financial	 institution	 to	 escape	 the	 prohibition	 by	 issuing	 nomi-
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––		 44	 See,	 e.g.,	 Charles	W.	Calomiris	&	Gary	Gorton,	The	Origins	 of	Banking	Panics:	Models,	 Facts,	
and	 Bank	 Regulation,	 in	 FINANCIAL	MARKETS	 AND	 FINANCIAL	 CRISES	 109	 (R.	 Glenn	 Hubbard	 ed.,	1991).	
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nally	 long-term	 instruments	with	embedded	put	options,	 for	 example,	which	 would	 be	 economically	 equivalent	 to	 short-term	 debt	 instru-ments	(p.	244).	 	 It	 is	not	clear	 that	 the	 legislation	adequately	address-es	 understandings	 not	 formalized	 in	 contract,	 an	 issue	 that	 proved	quite	 troublesome	during	 the	Crisis.45	 	Nor	does	Ricks	provide	 a	 con-vincing	 solution	 to	 the	 challenge	 that	 shadow	 banking	 could	 move	overseas	 and	 still	 pose	 a	 systemic	 threat	 to	 the	 U.S.	 financial	 system	(pp.	237–40).		Nonetheless,	he	is	attuned	to	the	challenge	of	regulatory	arbitrage.	 	The	issue	here	is	whether	there	are	instruments	other	than	short-term	 debt	 that	might	 be	money-like,	 and	whether	 those	 instru-ments	might	also	be	a	source	of	fragility.	We	 can	 begin	 by	 looking	 at	 the	 demand-side	 forces	 that	 have	helped	 propel	 the	 growth	 of	 the	 shadow	 banking	 system.	 	 For	 exam-ple,	recent	work	by	Zoltan	Pozsar	suggests	that	the	growth	of	“institu-tional	 cash	 pools,”	 that	 is,	 “large,	 centrally	 managed,	 short-term	 cash	balances	 of	 global	 non-financial	 corporations	 and	 institutional	 inves-tors	 such	 as	 asset	managers,	 securities	 lenders	 and	 pension	 funds”	 is	critical	 to	 explaining	 the	 growth	 of	 shadow	 banking.46	 	 According	 to	Pozsar,	 “between	2003	and	2008,	 institutional	cash	pools’	demand	for	insured	 deposit	 alternatives	 exceeded	 the	 outstanding	 amount	 of	short-term	 government	 guaranteed	 instruments	 not	 held	 by	 foreign	official	 investors	 by	.	.	.	at	 least	 $1.5	 trillion”	 and	 potentially	 far	more	—	data	is	limited	—	and	shadow	banking	arose,	at	least	in	part,	to	sat-isfy	this	excess	demand.47	Pozsar’s	findings	attest	to	the	magnitude	of	the	current	demand	for	money-like	 claims.	 	 As	 extensively	 documented	 elsewhere,	 nonfinan-cial	U.S.	 companies	are	holding	 record	amounts	of	 cash.	 	According	 to	one	 set	 of	 studies,	 such	 companies	 increased	 their	 aggregate	 cash	
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––		 45	 See,	 e.g.,	 Linda	 Allen	 &	 Anthony	 Saunders,	 Risk	 Management	 in	 Banking,	 in	 THE	 OXFORD	HANDBOOK	 OF	 BANKING	 160,	 162	 (Allen	 N.	 Berger	 et	 al.	 eds.,	 2015)	 (noting	 that	 in	 the	 Crisis,	“HSBC	 absorbed	 $45	 billion	 in	 assets”	 held	 in	 off-balance-sheet,	 and	 theoretically	 bankruptcy-remote,	vehicles	“in	order	to	protect	 its	reputation”);	Thomas	M.	Hoenig	&	Charles	S.	Morris,	Re-
structuring	 the	 Banking	 System	 to	 Improve	 Safety	 and	 Soundness,	 in	 THE	 SOCIAL	 VALUE	 OF	 THE	FINANCIAL	SECTOR:	TOO	BIG	TO	FAIL	OR	JUST	TOO	BIG?	401,	412	(Viral	V.	Acharya	et	al.	eds.,	2014)	(explaining	 that	 when	 a	 lack	 of	 liquidity	 caused	 another	 form	 of	 innovative	money	 creation	—	ABCP	programs	—	to	dysfunction	during	the	Crisis,	the	banks	sponsoring	the	programs	“general-ly	provided	 full	 support	when	affiliates	ran	 into	problems,”	despite	having	no	 legal	obligation	 to	do	 so,	 in	 order	 “to	 protect	 their	 reputations”);	 Anatoli	 Segura,	Why	 Did	 Sponsor	 Banks	 Rescue	Their	 SIVs?	 A	 Signaling	 Model	 of	 Rescues	 2	 (June	 16,	 2014)	 (unpublished	 manuscript),	http://ssrn.com/abstract=2552475	[https://perma.cc/U8FA-FQNX]	(explaining	that	“most	spon-sor	banks	 stepped	 in	 and	 rescued”	 the	ABCP	programs	 they	 sponsored	 “even	 though	 they	were	not	 contractually	 obliged	 to	 do	 so”	 and	 that	 “regulators	 attributed	 these	 and	 similar	 voluntary	support	decisions	to	the	reputational	concerns	of	the	sponsors”).		 46	 Zoltan	Pozsar,	Institutional	Cash	Pools	and	the	Triffin	Dilemma	of	the	U.S.	Banking	System,	22	FIN.	MARKETS	INSTITUTIONS	&	INSTRUMENTS	283,	285	(2013);	see	also	id.	at	291.		 47	 Id.	at	284	(emphasis	omitted);	see	also	id.	at	290	fig.5.	
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holdings	by	117%	between	2007	and	2014,48	with	holdings	rising	to	a	record	$1.73	trillion	by	year-end	2014.49		Although	the	trend	has	been	attributed	in	part	to	tax	considerations,	numerous	other	countries	face	similar	challenges,	suggesting	other	 forces	may	be	contributing	to	this	growing	 demand.50	 	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 rise	 of	 institutional	 inves-tors	 introduces	 an	 additional	 set	 of	 sophisticated	players	with	 signifi-cant	 amounts	 of	 cash	 that	 banks	 are	 not	 suited,	 and	 do	 not	 want,	 to	hold.51	 	 Overlaying	 and	 accentuating	 these	 developments	 are	 im-provements	 in	cash	management	 technology,	which	enable	companies	and	other	 institutions	 to	consolidate	an	 increasing	proportion	of	 their	cash	in	large,	centralized	pools.	As	Pozsar’s	work	 further	highlights,	 this	 increasingly	 sophisticated	demand	 for	money	 claims	 comes	 at	 a	 time	when	 the	 assets	 that	 have	long	served	a	money-like	 function	are	 in	distinctly	 short	 supply.52	 	As	documented	by	economists	like	Ben	Bernanke,	we	remain	in	the	midst	of	 a	 “global	 saving	 glut”	 in	which	 emerging-market	 and	 oil-rich	 coun-tries	are	holding	massive	volumes	of	U.S.	Treasuries	and	other	agency-backed,	 dollar-denominated	 assets,	 substantially	 reducing	 the	 availa-bility	 of	 such	 instruments	 for	 other	 holders.53	 	 The	 Federal	 Reserve’s	post-Crisis	 monetary	 interventions,	 which	 include	 buying	 up	massive	quantities	 of	 such	 assets,	 further	 contribute	 to	 the	 limited	 supply.54		Collectively,	 these	 trends	 help	 to	 explain	 both	 the	 size	 of	 the	 money	market	 today	 and	why,	 as	Ricks	 shows,	most	 of	 that	 demand	 is	 being	met	 outside	 the	 banking	 system	 (p.	 33).	 	 They	 also	 illuminate	 the	
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––		 48	 Caitlin	 Huston,	 Apple	 Still	 on	 Top	 as	 U.S.	 Corporate	 Cash	 Holdings	 Reach	 $1.73	 Trillion,	MARKETWATCH	(May	7,	2015,	1:59	PM),	h	t	t	p	:	/	/	w	w	w	.	m	a	r	k	e	t	w	a	t	c	h	.	c	o	m	/	s	t	o	r	y	/	a	p	p	l	e	-	s	t	i	l	l	-	o	n	-	t	o	p	-	a	s	-	u	s	-	c	o	r	p	o	r	a	t	e	-	c	a	s	h	-	h	o	l	d	i	n	g	s	-	r	e	a	c	h	-	1	7	3	-	t	r	i	l	l	i	o	n	-	2	0	1	5	-	0	5	-	0	7	[	h	t	t	p	s	:	/	/	p	e	r	m	a	.	c	c	/	5	R	R	L	-	A	F	5	P	].		 49	 U.S.	Non-Financial	Corporates’	Cash	Pile	Grows	to	$1.73	Trillion,	Led	by	Technology,	MOODY’S	(May	 7,	 2015),	 https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-US-non-financial-corporates-cash-pile-grows-to-173--PR_324721	[https://perma.cc/C293-73GQ].		 50	 Corporate	 Savings:	 Dead	 Money,	 THE	 ECONOMIST	 (Nov.	 3,	 2012),	http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21565621-cash-has-been-piling-up-companies%E2%80%99-balance-sheets-crisis-dead	 [https://perma.cc/FC92-ULJY];	 Corporate	
Savings	 in	 Asia:	 A	 $2.5	 Trillion	 Problem,	 THE	 ECONOMIST	 (Sept.	 27,	 2014),	http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21620203-japanese-and-south-korean-firms-are-worlds-biggest-cash-hoarders-hurts-their	[https://perma.cc/ZD3A-DV7X].		 51	 See	 generally	 Ronald	 J.	 Gilson	&	 Jeffrey	N.	 Gordon,	The	 Agency	 Costs	 of	 Agency	 Capitalism:	
Activist	Investors	and	the	Revaluation	of	Governance	Rights,	113	COLUM.	L.	REV.	863	(2013).		 52	 Pozsar,	supra	note	46,	at	284.		 53	 Ben	S.	Bernanke	et	al.,	International	Capital	Flows	and	the	Returns	to	Safe	Assets	in	the	Unit-
ed	 States,	 2003–2007,	 at	 1	 (Bd.	of	Governors	of	 the	Fed.	Reserve	Sys.,	 International	 Finance	Dis-cussion	Paper	No.	1014,	2011),	h	t	t	p	s	:	/	/	w	w	w	.	f	e	d	e	r	a	l	r	e	s	e	r	v	e	.	g	o	v	/	p	u	b	s	/	I	f	d	p	/	2	0	1	1	/	1	0	1	4	/	i	f	d	p	1	0	1	4		.	p	d	f	[	h	t	t	p	s	:	/	/	p	e	r	m	a	.	c	c	/	7	J	V	B	-	C	V	L	P	];	see	also	Ricardo	J.	Caballero	&	Arvind	Krishnamurthy,	Global	
Imbalances	and	Financial	Fragility,	99	AM.	ECON.	REV.	584	(2009).		 54	 Min	Zeng	&	Christopher	Whittall,	Central	Bank	Buying	Puts	Squeeze	on	Bond	Market,	WALL	STREET	 J.	 (July	 6,	 2016,	 7:16	 PM),	 http://www.wsj.com/articles/central-banks-put-squeeze-on-sovereign-debt-market-1467847016	[https://perma.cc/R4PJ-KQ5S].	
RICKS	REVIEW	12.1.2016.DOCX	 12/13/16	 –	 6:54	AM	
2017]	 THE	 IMPORTANCE	 OF	 M O N E Y ”	 19	
	
magnitude	 and	 sophistication	 of	 market	 forces	 that	 will	 create	 a	 de-mand	for	assets	that	fit	 into	the	third	category	described	above	—	im-perfect	 substitutes	 for	money	 claims	—	 should	 the	 supply	 of	 author-ized	money	claims	 fall	 short	or	 the	cost	of	holding	 those	claims	prove	too	great.55	Turning	 to	 the	 empirical	work	 on	 the	 premia	 that	 holders	 pay	 for	money-like	 financial	assets	affirms	the	value	of	moneyness	and	shows	that	 some	 longer-term	claims	 already	 serve	money-like	 functions.	 	 To	support	 the	 claim	 that	 short-term	debt	 is	money-like	 and	 that	money	claims	 have	 distinct	 utility,	 Ricks	 draws	 on	 work	 by	 Professor	 Robin	Greenwood	 and	 coauthors	 showing	 that	 holders	 of	 short-term	 Treas-uries	pay	 a	premium	 relative	 to	 “what	 one	would	 expect	 based	on	 an	extrapolation	of	 the	rest	of	 the	yield	curve”	 for	other	Treasury	 instru-ments	(p.	44).56	 	 In	that	work,	Greenwood	and	his	coauthors	attribute	this	deviation	to	the	extra	moneyness	associated	with	shorter-term	in-struments.	 	As	 they	explain,	 their	work	contributes	 to	a	broader	body	of	 “literature	 that	 documents	 significant	 deviations	 from	 the	 predic-tions	of	standard	asset	pricing	models	—	patterns	that	can	be	thought	of	 as	 reflecting	 money-like	 convenience	 services	 —	 in	 the	 pricing	 of	Treasury	 securities	 generally,	 and	 in	 the	 pricing	 of	 short-term	 T-bills	more	 specifically.”57	 	 They	 further	 acknowledge	 that	work	 by	 Profes-sors	 Arvind	 Krishnamurthy	 and	 Annette	 Vissing-Jørgensen	 suggests	“that	all	Treasuries	have	some	of	the	same	features	as	money,	namely,	liquidity	 and	 ‘absolute	 security	 of	 nominal	 repayment,’”58	 and	 that	“these	 liquidity	 and	 safety	 attributes	 lead	 Treasuries	 to	 have	 signifi-cantly	 lower	 yields	 than	 they	would	 in	 frictionless	 asset	 pricing	mod-els.”59	 	 In	 other	 words,	 short-term	 Treasury	 instruments	 are	 more	money-like	 than	 longer-term	 Treasury	 instruments,	 but	 all	 Treasury	instruments	 enjoy	 a	 moneyness	 premium.	 	 Moneyness	 is	 greater	 for	shorter-term	 instruments	 than	 longer-term	 ones,	 but	 the	 issue	 is	 one	of	degree.60	Ricks	 recognizes	 that	defining	money	has	always	been	a	 tricky	en-terprise	 and	 that	 any	 line	 drawing	 will	 result	 in	 some	 arbitrariness.		
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––		 55	 See	infra	Part	IV.		 56	 The	author	quotes	Robin	Greenwood,	Samuel	G.	Hanson	&	 Jeremy	C.	Stein,	A	Comparative-
Advantage	Approach	to	Government	Debt	Maturity,	70	J.	FIN.	1683,	1687	(2015).		 57	 Greenwood,	Hanson	&	Stein,	supra	note	56,	at	1685	(emphasis	added).		 58	 Id.	at	1686	(emphasis	added)	(quoting	Arvind	Krishnamurthy	&	Annette	Vissing-Jorgensen,	
The	Aggregate	Demand	for	Treasury	Debt,	120	J.	POL.	ECON.	233,	234	(2012));	see	also	Zhiguo	He,	Arvind	Krishnamurthy	&	Konstantin	Milbradt,	What	Makes	US	Government	Bonds	Safe	Assets?,	106	AM.	 ECON.	 REV.	 519	 (2016);	 Arvind	 Krishnamurthy	 &	 Annette	 Vissing-Jorgensen,	The	 Impact	 of	
Treasury	Supply	on	Financial	Sector	Lending	and	Stability,	118	J.	FIN.	ECON.	571	(2015).		 59	 Greenwood,	Hanson	&	Stein,	supra	note	56,	at	1686.		 60	 Id.	 at	 1688	 fig.1,	 Panel	 A	 (showing	 “[t]he	 money	 premium	 on	 short-term	 Treasury	 bills,	1983–2009”).	
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This	 is	 one	 of	 the	 domains	where	 Ricks	makes	 a	 lasting	 contribution	by	providing	a	concise	yet	thorough	overview	of	the	myriad	approach-es	 different	 groups	 use	 in	 defining	what	 constitutes	money.	 	 In	 addi-tion	 to	 explaining	 why	 central	 banks	 use	 multiple	 metrics	 when	 as-sessing	 the	 aggregate	 money	 supply,	 he	 explores	 alternative	 ways	 of	approaching	 the	 question,	 exploring,	 for	 example,	 what	 qualifies	 as	“cash	 and	 cash	 equivalents”	 under	 U.S.	 and	 foreign	 accounting	 rules	(pp.	27–46).		This	overview	supports	his	claim	that	drawing	the	line	at	one	 year	 should	 suffice	 to	 capture	 the	 great	 bulk	 of	 financial	 claims	that	 today	 get	 treated	 like	money	 (p.	 46).	 	 He	 does	 not,	 however,	 ad-dress	 the	 fact	 that	 even	 long-term	 instruments	 already	 enjoy	 some	money-like	status.	 	Nor	does	he	address	what	the	private	money	mar-ket	might	 look	 like	 in	a	world	where	all	 claims	of	 less	 than	a	year	are	government-insured	and	 costly	 to	hold;	 rather,	he	 seems	 to	assume	 it	won’t	exist.	A	 simple	 example	 illustrates	 why	 this	 assumption	 may	 not	 hold.		Consider	two	claims	a	person	could	hold	—	a	$100	demand	deposit	at	a	 local	 bank	 and	 a	 nominally	 long-term	 financial	 instrument	 that	 the	holder	 is	 guaranteed	 to	 be	 able	 to	 sell,	 instantly	 and	 at	 no	 cost,	 for	$100.	 	Economically,	there	is	no	difference	between	the	two,	assuming	the	 bank	 and	 the	 guarantee	 can	 both	 be	 trusted.	 	 Recent	 history	 pro-vides	a	more	concrete	example	and	shows	that	one	need	not	resort	to	hypotheticals	or	government	guarantees	to	find	long-term	instruments	that	enjoy	money-like	status.	Auction	 rate	 securities	 (ARS)	 are	 municipal	 and	 corporate	 bonds,	and	 sometimes	 preferred	 stocks,	 which	 typically	 have	 a	 maturity	 of	thirty	 years.61	 	 ARS	 derive	 their	 name	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 invest-ment	 banks	 underwriting	 the	 issuances	 would	 hold	 auctions	 for	 the	securities	on	a	regular	basis,	ranging	from	every	seven	to	every	thirty-five	days.	 	These	auctions	served	two	purposes	—	allowing	holders	of	ARS	to	sell	 those	securities	 if	 there	was	someone	ready	and	willing	 to	buy	them	and	establishing	the	 interest	rate	 for	ARS	outstanding.	 	Fur-ther	augmenting	 the	apparent	 liquidity	and	price	 stability	of	 these	 in-struments,	 the	 investment	 bank	 running	 the	 auction,	 which	 typically	had	 also	 sold	 and	marketed	 the	 issue,	would	 often	 provide	 support	 if	needed	 to	 avoid	 a	 failed	 auction.62	 	As	 a	 result,	 ARS	 appeared	 to	pro-vide	 many	 of	 the	 virtues	 of	 much	 shorter-term	 instruments.	 	 At	 the	same	time,	ARS	holders	regularly	earned	a	higher	rate	of	interest	than	they	 could	 earn	 from	 bank	 deposits	 or	 even	 money	 market	 mutual	
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––		 61	 Auction	Rate	Securities	Market:	A	Review	of	Problems	and	Potential	Resolutions:	Hearing	Be-
fore	the	H.	Comm.	on	Fin.	Servs.,	110th	Cong.	138	(2008)	[hereinafter	Hearing]	(statement	of	Linda	Chatman	Thomsen,	Director,	Division	of	Enforcement,	SEC).		 62	 Id.	
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funds.63	 	 By	 2008,	 there	 were	 $330	 billion	 ARS	 outstanding,	 and	 the	range	 of	 persons	 holding	 these	 instruments	 had	 expanded	 beyond	large,	 sophisticated	 institutional	players.64	 	When	 the	Crisis	hit	and	 li-quidity	generally	became	scarce,	the	differences	between	ARS	and	tru-ly	short-term	instruments	became	evident.	 	Because	of	a	 lack	of	 inter-ested	 buyers	 and	 because	 many	 of	 the	 investment	 banks	 sponsoring	those	 auctions	—	 facing	 liquidity	 constraints	 of	 their	 own	—	 ceased	their	 traditional	 practice	 of	 providing	 support	 to	 prevent	 failure,	 auc-tions	 increasingly	 failed.	 	 This	 situation	 left	 many	 ARS	 investors,	 at	least	for	a	while,	stuck	holding	the	instruments.65	ARS	 specifically	will	 not	 again	be	 an	 issue.	 	 The	Securities	 and	Ex-change	Commission	 (SEC)	charged	 the	 leading	ARS	underwriters	with	making	 fraudulent	 representations	 to	 clients	 regarding	 the	 liquidity	and	 safety	 of	 ARS	 and	 subsequently	 entered	 into	 settlement	 agree-ments	 that	 required	 the	underwriters	 to	buy	back	 significant	 swathes	of	the	instruments	still	outstanding.66		Moreover,	because	Ricks	knows	the	history	of	ARS,	his	proposed	legislation	would	treat	the	date	of	any	auction	 for	 an	 instrument	 as	 a	maturity	 date,	 thus	 prohibiting	 the	 is-suance	 of	 ARS.	 	 Nonetheless,	 the	 history	 of	 ARS	 remains	 instructive.		ARS	 were	 always	 long-term,	 risky	 instruments.	 	 For	 example,	 as	 ex-plained	 in	 the	 offering	 documents	 pursuant	 to	 which	 Citigroup	 sold	ARS,	 “[e]xisting	holders	will	be	able	 to	sell	 the	ARS	 in	an	auction	only	if	 there	are	bidders	willing	 to	purchase	all	 the	ARS	offered	 for	sale.”67		Those	 documents	 further	 stated	 that	 “failed	 auctions	 are	 possible,	 es-pecially	if	the	issuer’s	credit	were	to	deteriorate,	if	a	market	disruption	were	to	occur	or	if,	for	any	reason,	Citigroup	were	unable	or	unwilling	to	bid.”68		As	 reflected	 in	 the	SEC’s	enforcement	actions,	 some	of	 the	persons	selling	ARS	made	overly	rosy	statements	regarding	the	capacity	of	ARS	to	 serve	 as	 cash	 equivalents,	which	may	well	 have	 contributed	 to	 the	growth	of	 the	market	at	 its	height.	 	But	 the	ARS	market	grew	steadily	before	the	misstatements	occurred	and	before	any	unsophisticated	 in-vestors	 entered	 the	 market.	 	 As	 Martin	 Wolf	 has	 explained	 with	 re-spect	 to	 the	 relationship	 between	 fraud	 and	 booms	 and	 busts	 in	 gen-eral,	 “fraud	 accompanies	 booms”	 and	 “exacerbat[es]	.	.	.	fragility,”	 but	“it	 does	not	 cause	 them.”69	 	 “Vastly	more	 important	 than	 the	 outright	
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––		 63	 Id.		 64	 Id.		 65	 Id.;	 Auction	 Rate	 Securities:	 What	 Happens	 When	 Auctions	 Fail,	 FINRA	 (Nov.	 18,	 2008),	https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/Investor-Alert-Auction-Rate-Securities-What-Happens-When-Auctions-Fail.pdf	[https://perma.cc/WB9Y-YXWQ].		 66	 Hearing,	supra	note	61,	at	1.		 67	 Complaint	at	6,	SEC	v.	Citigroup	Glob.	Mkts.,	Inc.,	No.	08	Civ.	10753	(S.D.N.Y.	2008).		 68	 Id.		 69	 WOLF,	supra	note	22,	at	123.	
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fraud	 that	 always	 accompanies	 credit	 booms	 is	what	was	 legal	.	.	.	.”70		ARS	 offered	 some	 degree	 of	 moneyness	 and	 a	 higher	 rate	 of	 return	than	 other	more	money-like	 instruments,	 and	 investors	 seemed	quite	eager	to	hold	such	instruments.	In	short,	the	history	of	ARS	suggests	that	there	may	well	be	the	po-tential	 for	 category-three	 instruments	 —	 that	 is,	 longer-term	 instru-ments	 that	 enjoy	 some	 degree	 of	 moneyness	 —	 to	 flourish	 if	 the	book’s	 suggested	 reforms	 were	 adopted.	 	 Despite	 the	 breadth	 of	 the	proposed	legislation,	it	does	not	prohibit	pricing	devices	that	minimize	interest-rate	 risk,	 nor	 does	 it	 or	 could	 it	 prohibit	 longer-term	 instru-ments	 simply	 because	 there	 is	 a	 robust,	 liquid	 secondary	 market	 for	the	 instrument.	 	 And	 it	 is	 these	 features,	 rather	 than	 the	 auctions	themselves,	that	allowed	ARS	to	function	as	imperfect	but	viable	mon-ey	equivalents.	To	further	assess	the	viability	of	longer-term	instruments	as	substi-tutes	 for	 short-term	debt,	we	 can	 turn	 to	 the	 reasons	 individuals	 and	institutions	want,	 and	will	 pay	 a	 premium	 for,	money-like	 claims.	 	 As	Ricks	recognizes,	money	is	commonly	said	to	serve	at	least	three	func-tions	 (p.	 45).	 	 First,	 money	 serves	 as	 a	 unit	 of	 account	—	 goods	 and	services	 are	 priced	 in	 monetary	 terms.	 	 Second,	 money	 serves	 as	 a	medium	of	exchange	—	money	can	be	given	in	exchange	for	goods	and	services,	 precluding	 the	 need	 for	 both	 parties	 to	 have	 something	 tan-gible	 that	 the	 other	 desires.	 	 Third,	money	 serves	 as	 a	 store	 of	 value	over	 time.	 	 As	Mervyn	 King,	 former	 head	 of	 the	 Bank	 of	 England,	 ex-plains,	“[m]oney	gives	us	the	ability	to	exchange	 labour	today	for	gen-eralised	purchasing	power	in	the	future.”71	As	King	explains	 in	his	own	book	on	money	and	 financial	 stability,	the	transactional	dimension	of	money	animates	“[t]he	traditional	view	of	the	history	of	money.”72		In	King’s	assessment,	however,	“[m]oney	is	not	 principally	 a	means	 of	 buying	 ‘stuff’	 but	 a	way	 of	 coping	with	 an	uncertain	 future.	.	.	.	 Although	 we	 cannot	 literally	 insure	 against	 the	uninsurable,	we	can	try	to	keep	our	options	open	by	holding	claims	on	future	 purchasing	 power	 in	 a	 general	 monetary	 unit	 of	 account.”73		This	 view	 is	 not	 inconsistent	with	 Ricks’s	 account	 of	money,	 as	 Ricks	highlights	 the	 often-overlooked	 connection	 between	 the	 stickiness	 of	prices	and	the	utility	of	a	financial	asset	that	holds	its	value	in	relation	to	 those	 prices	 (p.	 46).	 	 But	 it	 does	 suggest	 that	 longer-term	 claims	that	hold	their	value	in	purchasing-power	terms	should	serve	as	mon-ey	equivalents.	 	 Just	as	importantly,	 it	sheds	additional	light	on	the	re-al-world	 setting	 in	 which	 such	 claims	 might	 evolve	 and	 spread.	 	 If	
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––		 70	 Id.		 71	 KING,	supra	note	19,	at	84.			 72	 Id.	at	64.		 73	 Id.	at	84–85.	
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most	money	 claims	are	held	 today	 to	 insure	 against	 an	uncertain	 and	potentially	distant	 future,	market	expectations	with	respect	 to	 liquidi-ty	 and	 the	 capacity	 of	 an	 instrument	 to	 hold	 its	 value	matter	 greatly;	but	whether	 the	secondary	market	 for	a	particular	 type	of	 instrument	is	actually	up	to	that	task	should	numerous	holders	seek	to	exit	simul-taneously	could	go	untested	for	decades.	Let	 us	 again	 return	 to	 the	 hypothetical	 that	 animates	 this	 Part.		Short-term	 claims	 are	 particularly	 money-like,	 even	 if	 continually	rolled	over	and	held	for	a	long	period	of	time,	because	they	simultane-ously	 limit	credit	risk,	duration	risk,	and	liquidity	risk.	 	But	 in	modern	financial	markets,	 these	 risks	 can	be	 addressed	 through	other	mecha-nisms.	 	Given	 that	Ricks	contemplates	 that	 “securities	 firms	and	other	nonbanks	might	be	given	free	rein	to	engage	in	structured	finance,	de-rivatives,	proprietary	trading,	and	so	forth”	(p.	25),	there	is	nothing	to	prevent	 the	 creation	 of	 longer-term	 money-like	 claims.	 	 A	 long-term	instrument	 that	 the	 holder	 expects	 will	 hold	 its	 value	 (which	 means	limited	credit	and	interest	rate	risk)	and	can	reliably	be	sold	at	 its	full	value	(which	means	there	must	be	a	liquid	secondary	market)	may	of-fer	 slightly	 less	 certainty	 along	 each	 of	 these	 dimensions,	 but	 the	 dif-ference	is	one	of	degree	rather	than	kind.74	That	substitutes	will	 likely	arise	and	spread	seems	even	more	like-ly	when	one	considers	the	effects	of	the	reforms	across	different	inter-est-rate	environments	and	across	boom-and-bust	cycles.		Regulation	Q,	which	 limited	 the	 interest	 rate	 banks	 could	 pay	 on	 deposits,	 worked	reasonably	 well	 until	 the	 country	 entered	 a	 period	 of	 high	 inflation.		But	 rate	 of	 return	 is	 always	 a	 relative	 measure,	 and	 when	 interest	rates	 on	 a	 product	 are	 capped,	 high	 interest	 rate	 environments	 in-crease	 incentives	 to	 find	 viable	 alternatives.75	 	 Growth	 cycles	 pose	 a	similar	 challenge.	 	As	 the	ARS	example	demonstrates,	 financial	 instru-ments	 that	 offer	 money-like	 features	 often	 evolve	 and	 spread	 during	periods	of	overall	financial	health	and	stability.	 	As	a	result,	even	risky	instruments	can	appear	to	be	money-like.		The	rise	of	instruments	that	are	money-like	in	good	times,	but	not	in	periods	of	unrest	(when	it	re-ally	matters),	 is	 particularly	 likely	 given	 that	 the	 financial	 institutions	underwriting	 and	 creating	 a	 secondary	 market	 for	 such	 instruments	have	 a	 self-interest	 in	 promoting	 perceptions	 of	 liquidity	 and	 price	
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––		 74	 Professor	Perry	Mehrling	and	coauthors	nicely	depict	how	financial	innovations	can	be	used	to	transform	any	risky	financial	instrument	into	a	money	equivalent	by	using	swaps	to	hedge	the	various	 risks	 to	which	 it	 is	 exposed.	 	See	 Perry	Mehrling	 et	 al.,	 Bagehot	Was	 a	 Shadow	Banker:	Shadow	Banking,	Central	Banking,	and	the	Future	of	Global	Finance	(Dec.	6,	2013)	(unpublished	manuscript),	http://ssrn.com/abstract=2232016	[https://perma.cc/H7TS-XWBY].		 75	 A	flip-side	challenge	arising	from	the	fact	that	Ricks	wants	not	only	a	cap,	but	also	a	floor,	is	that	 the	 government	 may	 have	 to	 assume	 risk	 and	 discount	 seigniorage	 in	 order	 to	 motivate	banks	to	issue	sufficient	money-like	securities.				
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stability.	 	 In	short,	that	short-term	claims	dominate	the	money	market	today	does	not	ensure	that	other	types	of	money-like	instruments	will	not	proliferate	 in	a	world	that	prohibits	the	 issuance	of	private,	short-term	debt.	In	Ricks’s	defense,	his	 lack	of	concern	with	the	moneyness	of	 long-term	 assets	 is	 consistent	 with	 his	 belief	 that	 coordination	 challenges	among	short-term	creditors	are	the	reason	for	financial	panics.		Ricks’s	depiction	 of	 the	 dynamics	 giving	 rise	 to	 coordination	 challenges	 de-pends	 on	 the	 capacity	 of	 money	 claimants	 to	 walk	 away	 quickly	 and	without	 cost,	 suggesting	 that	 the	 coordination	 challenge	might	 disap-pear	if	the	conditions	of	exit	were	changed.		The	capacity	of	short-term	claimants	to	exit	quickly	and	at	low	cost	certainly	contributes	to	fragil-ity,	 but	 the	 issue,	 given	 the	 scope	 of	 his	 claim,	 is	whether	 similar	 dy-namics	 could	 arise	 in	 other	 markets	 should	 his	 reforms	 be	 adopted.		Again,	history	suggests	this	is	possible.	One	 of	 the	 first	 notable	 uses	 of	 the	 term	 “fire	 sale”	 in	 connection	with	 a	 situation	 that	 posed	 systemic	 risk	 had	 little	 to	 do	 with	 short-term	financing.	 	 It	came	 instead	 in	 testimony	by	 then-Chairman	of	 the	Federal	Reserve	Alan	Greenspan,	regarding	the	Federal	Reserve’s	deci-sion	 to	 help	 avert	 the	 failure	 of	 the	 hedge	 fund	 Long-Term	 Capital	Management	(LTCM).76	 	LTCM	was	highly	 leveraged,	causing	 it	 to	 face	an	 extreme	 liquidity	 crunch,	 and	 it	 was	 deeply	 interconnected	 with	other	 financial	 institutions,	 creating	 concerns	 that	 its	 failure	 could	trigger	widespread	market	dysfunction,	but	none	of	the	debt	was	short	term	 and	 its	 creditors	 had	 no	 option	 to	 run.77	 	 We	 will	 never	 know	what	 would	 have	 happened	 had	 the	 Fed	 not	 intervened,	 but	 Green-span	 is	 far	 from	 alone	 in	 believing	 “the	 failure	 of	 LTCM”	 could	 have	“triggered	 the	 seizing	 up	 of	 markets,”	 inflicted	 “substantial	 dam-age	.	.	.	on	 many	 market	 participants,	 and	 impaired	 the	 economies	 of	many	nations,	including	our	own.”78	The	 history	 of	 ARS	 similarly	 demonstrates	 that	 investors	 can	 rush	to	 the	 exit	 in	 a	 panic-like	 fashion	 even	 when	 the	 financial	 assets	 in	question	 are	 long	 term.	 	 This	 history	 is	 particularly	 important	 when	viewed	 alongside	 the	 contraction	 of	 another	 money	 market	 that	 had	grown	 during	 the	 2000s	 money	 boom	—	 ABCP.	 	 ABCP	 is	 short-term	debt,	and	so	neatly	falls	within	Ricks’s	definition	of	money.	 	Yet	one	of	
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––		 76	 Andrei	 Shleifer	 &	 Robert	 Vishny,	 Fire	 Sales	 in	 Finance	 and	 Macroeconomics,	 J.	 ECON.	PERSPECTIVES,	Winter	 2011,	 at	 29,	 30;	 see	 Private-Sector	 Refinancing	 of	 the	 Large	 Hedge	 Fund,	
Long-Term	 Capital	 Management:	 Hearing	 Before	 the	 H.	 Comm.	 on	 Banking	 &	 Fin.	 Servs.,	 105th	Cong.	1	(1998)	(statement	of	Alan	Greenspan,	Chairman,	Fed.	Reserve	Bd.	of	Governors)	[herein-after	Greenspan	Testimony].		 77	 See	generally	ROGER	LOWENSTEIN,	WHEN	GENIUS	FAILED:	THE	RISE	AND	FALL	OF	LONG-TERM	CAPITAL	MANAGEMENT	(2001).		 78	 Greenspan	Testimony,	supra	note	76,	at	1.	
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the	primary	 reasons	 the	 seizing	up	of	 the	ABCP	market	 caused	banks	sponsoring	ABCP	programs	to	incur	massive	losses	was	one	that	could	just	as	easily	arise	 in	markets	 for	 long-term	instruments:	 they	wanted	to	 protect	 their	 reputations.79	 	 As	 Federal	 Reserve	 Governor	 Daniel	Tarullo	has	explained	in	describing	the	pre-Crisis	shadow	banking	sys-tem,	there	were	“notable	.	.	.	arrangements	in	which	guarantees	of	cap-ital	 preservation	 or	 liquidity	 provision	 were	 understood	 to	 ex-ist	.	.	.	even	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 contractual	 obligations	 for	 those	guarantees.”80	 	 It	was	 only	 “as	 asset	 values	were	 falling	 to	 points	 un-known”	 that	 “many	 of	 these	 implicit	 guarantees	 by	 financial	 entities	that	were	themselves	under	stress,”	were	withdrawn,	“amplif[ying]	the	growing	 liquidity	 crunch.”81	 	 Because	 major	 financial	 institutions,	whether	banks	or	broker-dealers,	are	 likely	 to	be	 the	ones	 that	create	and	 support	 the	 secondary	markets	 for	money-like,	 long-term	 instru-ments,	 if	 these	 institutions	 feel	 compelled	 for	 reputational	 reasons	 or	are	required	by	regulators	like	the	SEC	to	provide	liquidity	and	capital	support,	financing	crunches	may	well	result.	I	have	developed	in	other	work	the	mechanisms	through	which	the	information	 gaps	 that	 arise	 from	 shadow	 banking	 can	 give	 rise	 to	market	 dysfunction	 and	 price	 dislocations	 even	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 co-ordination	 games.82	 	 But	 there	 is	 no	 need	 to	 accept	 that	 account	 to	question	whether	 Ricks’s	 plan	would	 achieve	 its	 desired	 aim.	 	When-ever	 persons	 hold	 instruments	 because	 of	 their	 moneyness	 and	 new	information	casts	doubt	on	the	moneyness	of	those	instruments,	hold-ers	may	well	 rush	 to	exit.83	 	Panics,	as	understood	since	Walter	Bage-hot	 authored	 his	 classic	 1873	 treatise,	 arise	 when	 persons	 demand	cash	 instead	 of	 other	money-like	 claims;	 and	 they	 are	 recurrent	 phe-nomena	 because	 during	 periods	 of	 economic	 health,	 financial	 claims	that	entail	some	risk	are	regularly	given	money-like	status.84	
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––		 79	 See	sources	cited	supra	note	45.		 80	 Daniel	K.	Tarullo,	Governor,	Bd.	of	Governors	of	the	Fed.	Reserve	Sys.,	Remarks	at	the	Cen-ter	 for	 American	 Progress	 and	 Americans	 for	 Financial	 Reform	 Conference:	 Exploring	 Shadow	Banking:	Can	the	Nation	Avoid	the	Next	Crisis?	1	(July	12,	2016).		 81	 Id.		 82	 See	Judge,	supra	note	3.		 83	 See	 id.	 at	 37–38	 (explaining	 via	 a	 mechanism	 other	 than	 coordination	 challenges	 why	doubts	about	the	value	of	subprime	mortgage-backed	securities	caused	significant	market	disrup-tions	in	an	array	of	other	markets).		 84	 WALTER	BAGEHOT,	LOMBARD	STREET:	A	DESCRIPTION	OF	THE	MONEY	MARKET	118	 (14th	ed.	1924)	(1873)	(stating	that	a	 financial	panic	 is	“a	sudden	demand	for	cash”);	GORTON,	supra	note	3,	at	6	(“Whatever	the	form	of	the	bank	money,	financial	crises	are	en	masse	demands	by	holders	of	bank	debt	 for	cash	—	panics.”);	see	also	Perry	Mehrling	et	al.,	Bagehot	Was	a	Shadow	Banker:	Shadow	 Banking,	 Central	 Banking,	 and	 the	 Future	 of	 Global	 Finance	 9	 (Aug.	 15,	 2012)	 (un-published	 manuscript),	 http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/26329/Mehrling_10012012.pdf	[https://perma.cc/WUF6-V7PQ]	 (“Why	 insist	 on	 holding	 genuine	 Tbills	 when	 quasi-Tbills[,	 i.e.,	private	money	like	ABCP,]	promise	the	same	liquidity	but	with	a	slightly	higher	yield?”).	
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To	 be	 clear,	 this	 thought	 experiment	 is	 just	 that.	 	 Short-term	 debt	markets	 long	have	been	 and	 remain	 the	heart	 of	 the	problem.	 	 Short-term	 instruments	 are	more	money-like	 than	 longer-term	 instruments,	and	 their	structure	 increases	 the	 fragility	of	 the	 institutions	 that	 issue	them.		Scaling	back	private	short-term	debt	markets	would	do	much	to	improve	financial	stability	and	should	remain	a	priority.	 	Ricks’s	claim,	however,	 is	 not	 that	 his	 proposed	 reform	 would	 make	 the	 financial	system	safer.	 	His	 claim	 is	 that	eliminating	uninsured	short-term	debt	would	make	the	system	safe.		The	system	would	be	so	safe,	in	fact,	that	we	 could	 significantly	 roll	 back	 oversight	 and	 regulation	 of	 other	 fi-nancial	markets,	 including	 those	 that	 the	analysis	here	suggests	might	end	 up	 creating	 money-like	 instruments.	 	 Given	 that	 such	 reforms	would	 leave	 regulators	 woefully	 unprepared	 to	 respond	 should	 chal-lenges	 arise	 elsewhere	 in	 the	 system,	 it	 is	 entirely	 possible	 to	 believe	that	 Ricks	 has	 identified	 the	 core	 of	 the	 problem	without	 buying	 into	his	proposed	solution.	IV.		HISTORY	AND	GRAND	SOLUTIONS	With	 the	 benefit	 of	 hindsight,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 shadow	 banking	system	had	been	growing	 for	decades	prior	 to	 the	Crisis.	 	This	system	serves	many	of	the	economic	functions	long	fulfilled	by	banks,	such	as	credit	 creation	and	money	 creation.85	 	The	 system	also	 resembles	 the	banking	 system	 in	 being	 inherently	 fragile	 and	 vulnerable	 to	 runs.86		As	 Professor	 Gary	 Gorton	 has	 observed:	 “An	 important	 misunder-standing	 revealed	 by	 the	 crisis	 is	 that	 regulators	 and	 economists	 did	not	know	what	firms	were	banks,	or	what	debt	was	‘money.’”87	Ricks	 provides	 one	 response	 to	 these	 developments.	 	 In	 his	 view,	we	should	update	and	significantly	expand	the	regulatory	regime	 long	used	 to	 regulate	 banks.	 	 Through	 a	 sufficiently	 broad	 insurance	 pro-gram	complemented	by	a	sufficiently	broad	prohibition	on	the	types	of	financial	 instruments	 private	 entities	 could	 issue,	 the	 government	could	 effectively	 assert	 complete	 control	 over	 money	 creation.	 	 And	because	money	is	the	cause	of	financial	panics,	and	financial	panics	are	the	 cause	 of	 deep	 recessions,	 we	 would	 eliminate	 both	 by	 asserting	such	control.	 	The	scope	of	the	revised	regime	may	be	unprecedented,	but	 if	 one	 accepts	 the	 book’s	 assumptions,	 such	 a	 scope	 is	 required	and	justified	by	its	capacity	to	eliminate	financial	panics	and	fragility.	Alternatively,	one	could	 look	at	 the	growth	of	shadow	banking	and	the	failure	of	policymakers,	academics,	and	other	experts	to	appreciate	its	 importance	 prior	 to	 the	 Crisis	 as	 a	 reflection	 of	 the	 inevitable	 dy-
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––		 85	 Judge,	supra	note	3,	at	19–22.		 86	 Id.	at	33–34.		 87	 GORTON,	supra	note	3,	at	49.	
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namism	 of	 financial	markets,	 and	 a	 sign	 that	 policymakers	will	 never	be	 able	 to	 identify	 and	 address	 all	 sources	 of	 systemic	 instability	 in	advance.	 	 Shadow	 banking,	 including	 private	 money	 creation,	 will	emerge	—	whether	 driven	 by	 insufficient	 authorized	money,	 the	 high	cost	of	holding	such	money,	demand	for	credit,	or	other	market	forces.		When	 that	 happens,	 the	 hubris	 of	 believing	 that	 the	 government	 un-derstands	 and	 controls	more	 than	 it	 does	 can	 itself	 inhibit	 the	 ability	of	 regulators	 to	 identify	 and	 timely	 address	 financial	 fragility,	 leading	to	 larger	 and	more	destructive	 financial	 crises.88	 	What	we	need	 then	is	 not	 an	 all-encompassing	 and	 inherently	 rigid	 “solution”	 to	 financial	panics.	 	 Rather,	 we	 need	 regulators	 who	 recognize	 that	 they	 don’t	know	everything	so	they	must	remain	diligent	and	a	regime	with	suffi-cient	 flexibility	 that	 it	 enables	 regulators	 to	 identify	 and	 respond	 to	threats	 even	when	 they	 arise	 in	 corners	 not	 previously	 recognized	 as	risky.		As	Neel	Kashkari,	a	Fed	official	who	was	on	the	frontlines	of	the	Crisis	 recently	 opined,	 “[t]he	 financial	 crisis	 taught	 me	 the	 limits	 of	dogma.		I	learned	humility	and	pragmatism	the	hard	way.”89		Although	Ricks	 might	 reasonably	 protest	 having	 his	 proposal	 characterized	 as	dogma,	his	confidence	that	we	can	forgo	meaningful	oversight	of	much	of	the	financial	system	so	long	as	we	make	this	one	change	falls	pretty	close	to	the	line.	Looking	 beyond	 the	 Crisis	 to	 the	 long	 history	 of	 financial	 panics	provides	helpful	but	not	dispositive	guidance	with	respect	 to	which	 is	the	 better	 approach.	 	 History	 shows	 that	 private	 money	 creation	 is	pervasive,	 as	 is	 shadow	 banking	 if	 the	 latter	 term	 is	 defined	 as	 the	funding	of	long-term	assets	with	short-term	liabilities.		In	a	new	paper,	Professor	 Hugh	 Rockoff	 provides	 one	 of	 the	 first	 “systematic	 at-tempt[s]	 to	 compare	 and	 contrast”	 the	dozen	 financial	 panics	 that	 oc-curred	 in	 the	 United	 States	 from	 the	 Panic	 of	 1819	 through	 the	 Cri-sis.90		Rockoff	finds	that	“[t]ypically,	panics	were	started	by	a	cluster	of	failures,”	 including	 “one	 or	 more	.	.	.	shadow	 banks”	 and	 because	 one	of	 the	 failed	 shadow	banks	was	 often	 a	 prestigious	 firm,	 “[t]hese	 fail-ures	 were	 immediately	 interpreted	 as	 evidence	 that	 something	 fun-damental	had	gone	wrong	with	the	financial	system	and	that	only	cash	was	safe.”91	 	The	Panic	of	1907,	which	 led	 to	 the	 founding	of	 the	Fed-eral	Reserve,	 provides	 a	 concrete	 example.	 	 The	 crisis	 began	with	 the	
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––		 88	 See,	e.g.,	 Judge,	The	First	Year,	supra	note	8;	Hugh	Rockoff,	 It	 Is	Always	 the	Shadow	Banks:	The	Failures	that	Ignited	America’s	Greatest	Financial	Panics	(Apr.	29,	2016)	(unpublished	manu-script)	(on	file	with	the	Harvard	Law	School	Library).		 89	 Neel	Kashkari,	President,	Fed.	Reserve	Bank	of	Minneapolis,	Remarks	at	the	Economic	Club	of	Minnesota:	The	Role	 and	Limitations	of	Monetary	Policy	 (May	9,	2016);	 see	also	WOLF,	 supra	note	22,	 at	113	 (“Why	did	 the	world’s	 leading	economies	 fall	 into	 such	a	mess?	 	The	answer,	 in	part,	is	that	the	people	in	charge	did	not	believe	that	they	could	fall	into	it.”).		 90	 Rockoff,	supra	note	88,	at	3.			 91	 Id.	at	3–4.	
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failure	of	the	noted	Knickerbocker	Trust	and	runs	on	other	trust	com-panies.	 	 Trusts	 were	 less	 regulated	 than	 commercial	 banks	 and	 not	members	 of	 the	 clearinghouse	 system	 that	 banks	 had	 created	 among	themselves	 to	 avert	 and	 mitigate	 the	 effects	 of	 runs.92	 	 Nonetheless,	just	 like	 the	 shadow	banks	of	 today,	 they	had	a	 similar	 funding	 struc-ture	 to	 banks,	 played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 providing	 financing	 to	 the	real	economy,	and	proved	just	as	vulnerable	to	runs.93	In	 Rockoff’s	 view,	 history	 suggests	 that	 any	 effort	 to	 identify	 ex	ante	 the	 financial	 institutions	whose	 failure	might	 threaten	 the	 stabil-ity	 of	 the	 system	 is	 “a	 fraught	 task.”94	 	 “The	 failures	 that	 sparked	America’s	financial	panics	were	often	shadow	banks,	not	.	.	.	on	the	ra-dar	 screen	 of	 regulators.”95	 	 Looking	 further	 back	 and	 overseas,	 Pro-fessor	Perry	Mehrling	and	coauthors	argue	 that	 today’s	shadow	bank-ing	 system	 has	 much	 in	 common	 with	 the	 system	 of	 private	 money	creation	in	nineteenth-century	London.96	Ricks,	 I	 would	 infer,	 looks	 at	 this	 history	 of	 the	 growth	 of	 private	money	 and	 the	 crises	 that	 eventually	 follow	 as	 a	 sign	 that	 (with	 one	exception)	governments	have	never	gotten	it	right.		They	have	consist-ently	 failed	 to	 assert	 complete	 control	 over	money	 creation	 and	 as	 a	result	 have	 consistently	 left	 the	 financial	 system	 vulnerable	 to	 panics	and	 the	 devastation	 they	 can	 wreak.	 	 Another	 view	 is	 that	 market	forces	and	innovation	operate	collectively	to	produce	a	constantly	and	inevitably	 evolving	 financial	 system.	 	 In	 this	 frame,	 the	 frequent	 in-volvement	of	shadow	banks	is	not	a	sign	that	the	preexisting	regulato-ry	 umbrella	was	 inherently	 too	 small.	 	 Rather,	 it	 reflects	 the	 fact	 that	private	money	creation	and	shadow	banking	are	inevitable,	and	thus	it	is	best	to	institute	a	regulatory	regime	that	can	respond	to	such	devel-opments	 regardless	 of	 the	 particular	 form	 they	 happen	 to	 take.	 	 Put-ting	the	history	of	panics	 in	context	 further	suggests	 that	despite	pan-ics,	 the	 U.S.	 financial	 system	 has	 supported	 remarkable	 economic	growth.	 	 This	 raises	 questions	 about	 the	 growth	 potential	 that	might	be	sacrificed	in	attempting	to	create	a	panic-proof	regime.	Now	 to	 the	 exception	 on	 which	 Ricks	 hangs	 his	 hat:	 like	 many	banking	 scholars	 who	 appreciate	 that	 financial	 crises	 are	 common,	Ricks	 looks	 to	a	place	and	period	of	 comparative	stability	 to	 see	what	can	be	 learned.	 	While	Canada	 is	 the	 role	model	 for	many	 such	 schol-
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––		 92	 Carola	Frydman,	Eric	Hilt	&	Lily	Y.	Zhou,	Economic	Effects	of	Runs	on	Early	“Shadow	Banks”:	
Trust	Companies	and	the	Impact	of	the	Panic	of	1907,	123	J.	POL.	ECON.	902,	903	(2015).		 93	 Id.	at	907–12.		 94	 Rockoff,	supra	note	88,	at	37.		 95	 Id.		 96	 Mehrling	et	al.,	supra	note	74,	at	1.	
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ars,97	Ricks	 is	not	alone	 in	 looking	 to	 the	Quiet	Period,	 that	 is,	 the	pe-riod	between	1934	and	2007	when,	despite	 the	costly	Savings	&	Loan	debacle,	 the	United	 States	 did	not	 have	 a	 single	major	 financial	 crisis.		This	 is	 a	 venerable	 methodological	 approach	 and	 one	 that	 can	 yield	meaningful	 insight	 into	 the	 relationship	 among	 regulatory	 regimes,	economic	and	other	conditions,	and	the	probability	of	panics.		As	Ricks	contends,	 the	 relative	 stability	 of	 the	U.S.	 financial	 system	during	 this	period	 supports	 the	value	of	deposit	 insurance	as	 a	way	of	helping	 to	deter	runs.	One	 challenge	 in	 using	 the	Quiet	 Period	 to	 justify	Ricks’s	 proposal	is	 that	historically,	deposit	 insurance	has	always	been	capped,	 leaving	large	depositors	 and	other	 short-term	 creditors	—	 like	 bank	 counter-parties	 who	 may	 have	 been	 important	 disciplinarians	 in	 recent	 dec-ades	—	 nominally	 exposed.98	 	 Larger	 depositors	 were	 regularly	 pro-tected	 in	 practice,	 but	 such	 protection	 was	 never	 assured.99	 	 We	simply	 cannot	 know	 how	 much	 the	 possibility	 that	 large	 creditors	might	 incur	 losses	 shaped	 bank	 and	 creditor	 behavior	 in	 ways	 that	were	 beneficial	 and	 would	 be	 foreclosed	 under	 Ricks’s	 approach.100		This	 itself	 does	not	undermine	his	 claim,	but	 it	 does	highlight	 the	 im-portance	of	recognizing	it	as	a	significant	expansion	—	not	 just	an	up-dating	—	 of	 the	 historical	 approach	 to	 bank	 regulation	 in	 the	 United	States.	The	 greater	 challenge	 is	 that	 the	 factors	 distinguishing	 today’s	 fi-nancial	 system	 and	 overall	 economic	 conditions	 from	 those	 that	 pre-vailed	 during	 the	 Quiet	 Period	 go	 far	 beyond	 those	 that	 Ricks	 claims	will	suffice	 to	restore	stability.	 	Other	scholars	have	argued,	 for	exam-ple,	 that	 meaningful	 barriers	 to	 entry	 allowed	 most	 banks	 to	 enjoy	“charter	value”	—	the	term	banking	scholars	use	for	the	expectation	of	future	 monopoly	 rents	 —	 during	 the	 Quiet	 Period.101	 	 This	 in	 turn	
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––		 97	 E.g.,	CHARLES	W.	CALOMIRIS	&	STEPHEN	H.	HABER,	FRAGILE	BY	DESIGN:	THE	POLITICAL	ORIGINS	OF	BANKING	CRISES	AND	SCARCE	CREDIT	283–327	(2014);	Kurt	Schuler,	Free	Banking	in	Canada,	in	THE	EXPERIENCE	OF	FREE	BANKING	79	(Kevin	Dowd	ed.,	1992).		 98	 RICHARD	SCOTT	CARNELL,	JONATHAN	R.	MACEY	&	GEOFFREY	P.	MILLER,	THE	LAW	OF	FINANCIAL	INSTITUTIONS	 371–75	 (5th	 ed.	 2013)	 (providing	 history	 of	 coverage,	 in	 both	 nominal	 and	 infla-tion-adjusted	terms,	since	deposit	insurance	was	first	instituted	in	1934).		 99	 E.g.,	MICHAEL	S.	BARR,	HOWELL	E.	 JACKSON	&	MARGARET	E.	TAHYAR,	FINANCIAL	REGULATION:	LAW	AND	POLICY	238	(2016)	 (noting	 that	 since	 the	United	States	adopted	deposit	 insurance,	 the	country	 “has	 seen	 very	 few	 runs,”	 but	 also	 noting	 that	 “[i]t	 is	 not	 that	 runs	 never	 occur,”	 and	providing	examples	of	when	they	have).		 100	 See,	 e.g.,	Charles	Enoch,	Peter	Stella	&	May	Khamis,	Transparency	and	Ambiguity	 in	Central	
Bank	Safety	Net	Operations	(IMF,	Working	Paper	No.	138,	1997).		 101	 E.g.,	GORTON,	 supra	note	3,	 at	133	 (“There	was	no	 financial	 crisis	between	1934	and	2007	because	 .	.	.	banks	 were	 earning	 monopoly	 profits	 .	.	.	.”);	 see	 also	 Thomas	 F.	 Hellman,	 Kevin	 C.	Murdock	&	Joseph	E.	Stiglitz,	Liberalization,	Moral	Hazard	 in	Banking,	and	Prudential	Regulation:	
Are	 Capital	 Requirements	 Enough?,	 90	AM.	 ECON.	 REV.	 147	 (2000)	 (showing	 the	 benefits	 of	 ena-bling	banks	to	enjoy	charter	value	relative	to	capital	requirements).	
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made	 bank	managers	 and	 shareholders	more	 risk	 averse	 and	 less	 in-clined	 to	 innovate,	 as	 they	would	 lose	 prospective	 rents	 in	 the	 event	their	 bank	 failed.	 	 But	 Ricks	 does	 not	 want	 to	 restore	 charter	 value,	and	 the	 ramifications	 of	 a	 robust	 insurance	 scheme	 in	 a	world	where	bank	 shareholders	 enjoy	monopoly	 rents	 are	 quite	 different	 from	 the	challenges	such	an	insurance	scheme	would	pose	absent	charter	value.	The	 trends	 documented	 above	 regarding	 the	 consolidation	 of	 cash	balances	among	large	corporations	and	institutional	investors	and	for-eign	demand	for	safe	assets	are	also	relevant.	 	 It	 is	not	 just	that	 finan-cial	 innovations	 and	 the	 cross-border	movement	 of	 capital	 enable	 the	creation	 of	 money-like	 claims	 outside	 the	 banking	 system,	 but	 also	that	 the	demand	 for	money	claims	 today	comes	 from	 institutions	 that	are	far	more	sophisticated	and	have	far	more	at	stake	than	their	twen-tieth-century	counterparts.	 	Even	assuming	Ricks	is	correct	that,	when	managing	money,	a	 “portfolio	manager’s	 job	 is	 first	 to	ensure	 that	 the	funds	 he	 invests	will	 be	 available	whenever	 his	 firm	 needs	 them	 and	only	 second	 to	 maximize	 the	 return	 he	 earns	 on	 these	 funds”	 (p.	45),102	today’s	money	claimants	seem	unlikely	to	completely	forgo	the	second	of	these	two	aims.	History	is	an	important	guide	in	the	ongoing	efforts	to	build	a	more	stable	 financial	 system.	 	 Understanding	 how	 regulatory	 interventions,	market	 forces,	 and	 interactions	 between	 the	 two	 have	 contributed	 to	crises	as	well	as	periods	of	 stability	 is	 critical	 to	carving	a	better	path	forward.	 	But	 to	 learn	 the	 right	 lessons,	 all	 of	 these	dynamics	and	 the	historically	 contingent	 context	 in	which	 they	arise	must	be	 taken	 into	account.	 	 My	 assessment	 of	 history	 is	 that	 innovation	 and	 dynamism	are	endemic,	suggesting	the	need	for	a	financial	regulatory	regime	that	anticipates	 and	 harnesses	 those	 forces.	 	 Ricks	 argues	 instead	 that,	 at	least	 in	 the	 context	 of	money	 creation,	we	 can	 and	 should	 shut	 them	down.		When	coupled	with	our	different	assessments	of	whether	there	is	a	role	for	creditor	discipline	in	connection	with	money	creation	and	the	 viability	 and	 costs	 of	 trying	 to	 define	 and	 regulate	 ex	 ante	 all	 fi-nancial	claims	that	might	serve	as	money,	there	are	some	fundamental	differences	in	our	optimal	reform	agendas.	Putting	 the	 analyses	 in	 each	 Part	 together	 provides	 a	 blueprint	 of	those	 differences.	 	 If	money	market	 claimants	 have	 some,	 but	 incom-plete,	 information	 and	 if	 the	 threat	 of	 discipline	 imposed	 by	 money	claimants	 is	 socially	 useful	 in	 some	 settings	 and	 some	 states	 of	 the	world,	 but	 highly	 destructive	 in	 others,	 then	 unfettered	market	 disci-pline	 and	 excessive	 government	 control	 each	 lead	 to	 suboptimal	 out-comes,	 albeit	 for	 different	 reasons.	 	 The	 better	 response	 is	 one	 that	
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––		 102	 The	 author	 quotes	 MARCIA	 STIGUM	 &	 ANTHONY	 CRESCENZI,	 STIGUM’S	 MONEY	 MARKET	 456	(4th	ed.	2007).	
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seeks	 to	 harness	 the	 productive	 dimensions	 of	 market-based	 infor-mation	 generation	 and	 discipline	 while	 blunting	 those	 forces	 when	they	operate	contrary	to	social	welfare.	 	To	be	effective,	 this	approach	must	also	embrace	the	inevitable	dynamism	of	 finance	and	its	respon-siveness	to	regulation.	In	 practice,	 this	 means	 distinguishing	 market	 developments	 that	threaten	 the	 health	 of	 individual	 institutions	 or	 that	 will	 result	 in	meaningful	but	 contained	 losses	 from	developments	 that	 threaten	 the	stability	of	 the	 financial	 system	as	a	whole.	 	 It	means	casting	an	over-sight	 net	 that	 reaches	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 prudential	 regulatory	regime,	enhancing	the	capacity	of	regulators	to	identify	and	respond	to	threats	 that	 arise	 in	 domains	 not	 traditionally	 recognized	 as	 systemi-cally	important.		It	means	sometimes	using	both	a	belt	and	suspenders	in	 case	 the	 design	 of	 one	 proves	wanting	 or	 is	 attached	 to	 the	wrong	pair	of	pants.	 	It	means	supporting	structural	reforms	aimed	at	simpli-fying	financial	 institutions,	 instruments,	and	markets,	but	not	in	a	way	that	draws	hard	 lines	between	domains	 that	 should	be	 simplified	and	monitored	 and	 others	 that	 should	 not.	 	 It	means	 protecting	 the	 exist-ence	 and,	 to	 an	 extent,	 the	 autonomy	 of	 central	 banks,	 which	 have	 a	range	of	tools	that	they	can	deploy	to	fight	crises	 in	a	manner	respon-sive	 to	 the	particular	 challenge	 they	 are	 facing.	 	And	 it	means	 institu-tionalizing	 ex	 post	 mechanisms	 of	 support	 alongside	 ex	 ante	 regula-tion.	A	 concrete	 example	 of	 a	 reform	 that	 builds	 on	 Ricks’s	 insights	while	 fitting	 the	alternative	paradigm	advocated	here	would	be	 to	ex-pand	 regulators’	 crisis	management	 toolkit	 to	 explicitly	 include	 a	 role	for	the	government	as	“insurer	of	last	resort,”	alongside	its	established	role	as	 lender	of	 last	 resort.	 	The	notion	 that	central	banks	should	act	as	 a	 lender	 of	 last	 resort	 to	 provide	 needed	 liquidity	 when	 market-based	 sources	 run	dry	dates	back	more	 than	200	years,	 and	 the	prin-cipled	norms	regarding	when	and	how	central	banks	should	fulfill	this	role	were	largely	set	forth	by	Bagehot	in	1837.103	 	In	theory,	access	to	a	 lender	 of	 last	 resort	 enables	 a	 financial	 institution	 facing	 excess	withdrawals	 to	 use	 its	 assets	 as	 collateral	 to	 obtain	 fresh	 liquidity,	thereby	 avoiding	 the	 need	 to	 engage	 in	 a	 value-destroying	 asset	sale.104	 	 Just	 as	 importantly,	 the	 very	 existence	 of	 a	 lender	 of	 last	 re-sort	should	deter	coordination-based	runs,	as	short-term	claimants	no	longer	face	the	losses	resulting	from	those	fire	sales.105	
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––		 103	 BAGEHOT,	 supra	 note	 84;	 see	 also	 Kathryn	 Judge,	The	 Federal	 Reserve:	 A	 Study	 in	 Soft	 Con-
straints,	78	LAW	&	CONTEMP.	PROBS.,	no.	3,	2015,	at	65,	78–82,	and	sources	cited	therein.		 104	 Paul	 Tucker,	The	 Lender	 of	 Last	 Resort	 and	Modern	 Central	 Banking:	 Principles	 and	Recon-
struction	 14–16	 (Bank	 of	 Int’l	 Settlements,	 Working	 Paper	 No.	 79,	 2014),	http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap79b_rh.pdf	[https://perma.cc/CBK6-RYZN].		 105	 Id.	at	15.	
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The	Crisis	affirmed	the	 importance	of	having	a	central	bank	that	 is	authorized	and	willing	to	serve	as	a	lender	of	last	resort,	but	it	also	re-vealed	the	challenges	 inherent	 in	such	 interventions.106	 	To	effectively	deter	runs,	a	 lender	of	 last	resort	must	be	able	to	signal	 to	short-term	creditors	 that	 they	 will	 be	 protected.	 	 Allowing	 the	 government	 to	make	such	assurances	directly,	whether	through	an	insurance	or	guar-antee	scheme,	could	be	a	 far	more	effective	way	of	bringing	about	 the	desired	 result.	 	 This	 is	 the	 logic	 animating	 the	 book’s	 claim	 that	 ex-panding	 insurance	 will	 prevent	 runs.	 	 Moreover,	 given	 that	 the	 gov-ernment	 should	 provide	 lender-of-last-resort	 support	 only	 to	 solvent	institutions,	 having	 the	 government	 instead	 act	 as	 an	 insurer	 of	 last	resort	would	not	necessarily	entail	greater	credit	risk	or	engender	ad-ditional	moral	hazard	relative	to	the	prevailing	approach.	Significantly,	 insurer	 of	 last	 resort	 is	 not	 a	 novel	 role	 for	 the	 gov-ernment	 to	 play.	 	 Some	 of	 the	more	 successful	 government	 interven-tions	at	 the	height	of	 the	Crisis,	 including	a	Treasury	Department	pro-gram	 that	provided	a	guarantee	 to	money	market	mutual	 funds	when	the	 industry	 faced	widespread	withdrawals	 after	 one	 fund	 “broke	 the	buck”	 and	 the	 FDIC’s	 Transaction	 Account	 Guarantee	 Program,	which	fully	insured	noninterest-bearing	transactional	accounts	for	participat-ing	 banks,	 are	 prime	 examples	 of	 the	 government	 doing	 precisely	this.107	 	 These	 programs	 illustrate	 that	 whether	 a	 program	 is	 struc-tured	 as	 an	 insurance	 scheme	 or	 a	 guarantee	matters	 little;	 runs	 can	be	stopped	whenever	the	government	intervention	assures	designated	claimants	 that	 they	 will	 be	 protected	 from	 liquidity	 risk	 and	 credit	
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––		 106	 E.g.,	 OFFICE	 OF	 INSPECTOR	 GEN.,	 FED.	 RESERVE,	 THE	 FEDERAL	 RESERVE’S	 SECTION	 13(3)	LENDING	 FACILITIES	 TO	 SUPPORT	 OVERALL	 MARKET	 LIQUIDITY:	 FUNCTION,	 STATUS,	 AND	 RISK	MANAGEMENT	 3–8	 (2010),	https://oig.federalreserve.gov/reports/FRS_Lending_Facilities_Report_final-11-23-10_web.pdf	[https://perma.cc/JYW2-RVMZ]	(providing	an	overview	of	the	various	programs	the	Federal	Re-serve	 instituted	 using	 its	 lender-of-last-resort	 authority);	Olivier	Armantier	 et	 al.,	Discount	Win-
dow	 Stigma	 During	 the	 2007–2008	 Financial	 Crisis,	 118	 J.	 FIN.	 ECON.	 317,	 326	 (2015)	 (showing	that	stigma	deterred	banks	 from	borrowing	despite	encouragement	 from	the	Federal	Reserve	 to	do	so);	Viral	V.	Acharya	&	Bruce	Tuckman,	Unintended	Consequences	of	LOLR	Facilities:	The	Case	of	
Illiquid	 Leverage	 3,	 4	 (IMF,	 Working	 Paper,	 14th	 Jacques	 Polak	 Annual	 Research	 Conference,	2013),	 http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2013/arc/pdf/viral.pdf	[https://perma.cc/AG7V-DL4M]	(showing	that	one	effect	of	access	to	a	LOLR	“is	to	give	the	bank	leeway	 to	 reduce	deleveraging	sales	of	 illiquid	assets,”	 id.	 at	3,	making	 them	more	vulnerable	 to	further	 adverse	 shocks);	 Gary	 B.	 Gorton,	 Andrew	Metrick	 &	 Lei	 Xie,	The	 Flight	 from	Maturity	 1	(Nat’l	 Bureau	 of	 Econ.	 Research,	 Working	 Paper	 No.	 20027,	 2014),	http://www.nber.org/papers/w20027.pdf	 [https://perma.cc/GS9X-83VS]	 (“argu[ing]	 that	 the	financial	 system	became	 increasingly	 fragile	during	 the	 crisis,	 so	 that	 even	 a	 small	 shock	would	have	led	to	a	large	response	at	that	point	in	the	crisis”	in	ways	that	would	not	have	been	possible	without	lender-of-last-resort	interventions).		 107	 E.g.,	 Press	Release,	 U.S.	 Dep’t	 of	 the	 Treasury,	 Treasury	Announces	 Temporary	Guarantee	Program	 for	Money	Market	Funds	 (Sept.	 29,	 2008);	Temporary	Liquidity	Guarantee	Program,	FDIC	 (last	 updated	 Feb.	 27,	 2013),	 https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/tlgp	[https://perma.cc/5RQA-CNV5].	
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risk,	 thereby	 removing	 the	 incentive	 to	 run.	 	 And,	 because	 these	schemes	were	adopted	well	over	a	year	into	the	Crisis,	at	a	time	when	panic	was	widespread	 and	 a	major	 threat	 to	market	 functioning,	 they	would	 not	 undermine	 the	 incentive	 of	 short-term	 claimants	 to	 disci-pline	 institutions	 for	assuming	 idiosyncratic	 risks	outside	of	 crisis	pe-riods.	To	be	sure,	 the	devil	 is	 in	 the	details.	 	The	ongoing	struggle	 to	bal-ance	 the	 stability-enhancing	 benefits	 of	 having	 a	 lender	 of	 last	 resort	with	the	moral	hazard	such	interventions	engender	suggests	that	there	is	not	going	to	be	an	easy	way	to	optimize	this	balance	when	the	gov-ernment	 instead	provides	emergency	 insurance	or	 guarantees.	 	More-over,	 despite	 the	 success	 of	 the	 Treasury	 and	 FDIC	 interventions	 in	this	vein,	those	interventions	also	illustrate	that	the	provision	of	crisis-period	 insurance	may	 justify	 post-crisis	 reforms.108	 	 Nonetheless,	 de-veloping	a	comprehensive	set	of	principled	norms	regarding	when	and	how	 the	 government	 should	 act	 as	 an	 insurer	 of	 last	 resort,	 explicitly	protecting	a	class	of	claimants	otherwise	positioned	to	run	in	order	to	avert	 the	 systemic	 effects	 of	 their	 doing	 so,	 is	 a	 concrete	 example	 of	how	Ricks’s	 insights	could	be	deployed	 to	expand	 the	arrows	 in	 regu-lators’	quiver	as	part	of	a	more	dynamic	and	viable	regulatory	reform	agenda.	Returning	 to	 the	big	picture,	Ricks	 convincingly	demonstrates	 that	today’s	 short-term	 debt	 markets	 are	 excessively	 large	 given	 their	 in-herent	 fragility	 and	 that	 insurance	 should	 be	 among	 the	 tools	 regula-tors	use	in	their	efforts	to	promote	stability.	 	Beyond	that,	the	analysis	here	 suggests	 a	more	moderate	 approach	 to	 reform	may	 be	more	 ef-fective	 in	 tackling	 the	 challenges	money	markets	 pose,	 while	 also	 in-flicting	 fewer	 barriers	 to	 credit	 creation	 and	 economic	 growth.	 	 Forg-ing	 a	 middle	 path	 will	 entail	 difficult	 judgment	 calls,	 and	implementation	 will	 require	 accepting	 rules	 that	 are	 overinclusive	along	 some	 dimensions	 and	 underinclusive	 along	 others.	 	 Given	 the	drawbacks	of	giving	 too	much	power	 to	either	 the	market	or	 the	gov-ernment,	however,	and	 the	 inherent	dynamism	of	 finance,	 this	 type	of	approach	 is	 the	 least	 imperfect	 of	 the	 various	 options	 available.	 	 Re-gardless	 of	 the	 approach	 taken,	 ongoing	 reform	 efforts	 will	 be	 en-
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––		 108	 E.g.,	Money	Market	 Fund	Reform;	Amendments	 to	 Form	PF,	 79	Fed.	Reg.	 47,736	 (Aug.	 14,	2014)	(codified	at	17	C.F.R.	pts.	230,	239,	270,	274	&	279)	(making	numerous	substantive	chang-es	to	the	rules	governing	money	market	mutual	funds	to	address	deficiencies	contributing	to	the	need	for	government	intervention	to	prevent	runs	on	these	funds);	Temporary	Liquidity	Guaran-tee	 Program;	 Unlimited	 Deposit	 Insurance	 Coverage	 for	 Noninterest-Bearing	 Transaction	 Ac-counts,	80	Fed.	Reg.	65,919	(Oct.	28,	2015)	(codified	at	12	C.F.R.	pts.	330	&	370)	(describing	the	evolution	of	the	FDIC’s	emergency	guarantee	authority,	including	how	it	was	used	during	the	Cri-sis	and	subsequently	revised	pursuant	to	the	Dodd-Frank	Act).	
RICKS	REVIEW	12.1.2016.DOCX	 12/13/16	 –	 6:54	AM	
34	 HARVARD	 LAW	 REVIEW	 [Vol.	130:1	
	
hanced	if	policymakers	heed	Ricks’s	insights	regarding	the	importance	and	distinctiveness	of	money.	CONCLUSION	
The	Money	Problem	 provides	 a	 beacon	of	 light	 amid	 the	morass	 of	complexity	 that	 has	 come	 to	 plague	 financial	 institutions,	 financial	markets,	 and	 efforts	 to	 regulate	 both.	 	 In	 it,	 Ricks	 identifies	 the	 key	questions	that	must	be	asked	to	better	understand	financial	panics	and	fragility,	reveals	the	inadequacy	of	the	answers	produced	thus	far,	and	makes	 a	 convincing	 case	 that	 structural	 reforms	 targeting	 the	 institu-tions	 that	 produce	 money	 may	 be	 critical	 components	 of	 efforts	 to	forge	 a	 more	 stable	 financial	 system.	 	 Making	 progress	 along	 one	 of	these	 fronts,	 much	 less	 all	 three,	 would	 be	 a	 significant	 contribution.		Some	 readers	 may	 be	 convinced	 by	 Ricks’s	 grand	 vision	 of	 a	 panic-proof	 system,	but	even	 those	who	are	not	have	much	 to	gain	 from	al-lowing	him	the	opportunity	to	make	his	case.	
